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Abstract 
A n examination of the effectiveness of measures of European Community law to harmonise 
intellectual property protection throughout the Community, focusing on two consequences 
of these measures: first , the adverse impact on the commercial value of the intellectual 
property in the hands of the proprietor or licensee and, secondly, the implications for the due 
diligence enquiry of the scope of protection conferred by intellectual property rights 
undertaken whenever an interest in intellectual property is acquired. 
The position of the national law of Member States following accession to the Community is 
examined, in particular its limits to confer monopoly or quasi monopoly protection on the 
intellectual property proprietor. The effect of international cooperation (such as the Berne 
Convention) in shaping national law is considered by way of essential background to 
determine the extent to which obstacles to the implementation of Community principles 
result. 
Particular attention is given to the inter-relation between the provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome and national law, insofar as the free movement principles of Articles 30 to 36 and the 
competition law prohibition of Article 85(1) conflict with the scope of intellectual property 
rights conferred nationally. 
The role of Commission Regulations conferring exemption f rom Article 85(1) for intellectual 
property agreements is illustrated by reference to Commission Regulations EC 240/96 
(concerning technology transfer agreements) and EC 418/85 (concerning research and 
development agreements). Finally an assessment is made of the effectiveness of selected 
Council Directives (91/250 EEC and 93/98 EC concerning computer software and duration 
of copyright) as harmonisation measures, taking into account existing sources of law and the 
needs of emerging technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
T H E V A L U E O F M O N O P O L Y O R Q U A S I - M O N O P O L Y R I G H T S AND 
T H E N E E D F O R D U E D I L I G E N C E 
The commercial value of intellectual property is determined (inter alia) by the 
scope of the monopoly or quasi-monopoly rights conferred on the proprietor, 
whose competitive edge depends on being able to prevent others committing 
acts of infringement. The purpose of due diligence investigation, carried out 
on the acquisition or disposal of intellectual property, is to verify for the 
purchaser, licensor or licensee of intellectual property the extent of that 
protection. For each category of intellectual property (copyright, design right, 
registered designs, know-how, patents and trademarks), it is necessary to 
establish the nature of protection conferred, in particular, the extent of 
restricted acts that amount to infringement, the duration of protection, any 
statutory exceptions that might be relevant, any potential licences of right and 
other inherent limitations to the f u l l enforcement of restricted acts that are 
otherwise conferred by that intellectual property right. The process of 
verification therefore begins with identification of all mtellectual property and 
an assessment of the commercial value of the rights conferred. The sources 
of law referred to in the remainder of this Chapter, each of which w i l l be 
considered individually in succeeding chapters, have shaped the way in which 
the law of intellectual property has been harmonised internationally but 
particularly within the European Community (the "Community"), and impose 
limitations on the use and exercise of intellectual property. An assessment of 
the impact of such measures upon the commercial value of intellectual 
property is essential when carrying out due diligence investigation and yet in 
practise such an assessment is not feasible. This study w i l l focus on the 
effectiveness of measures aimed at harmonising intellectual property law, on 
their adverse impact on the commercial value to the proprietor, and on their 
consequences for the process of assessing the scope of intellectual property 
protection. 
B . I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O N V E N T I O N S 
In Chapter One, the role of Conventions and other forms of international 
cooperation w i l l be examined by way of background to provide the essential 
context for the Community-specific harmonisation measures that are the main 
focus of this work. Those harmonisation measures comprise the Treaty of 
Rome ("the Treaty"), Commission Regulations and Council Directives. 
C . T H E T R E A T Y O F R O M E 
The Articles of the Treaty that deserve special attention, because they limit the 
exclusive rights of the intellectual property proprietor, are Articles 30 and 36 
(which provide for the free movement of goods) and Articles 85(1) and 86 
(which prevent any anti-competitive practices or abuse of dominant position). 
Treaty provisions w i l l be the subject of Chapter Two. 
Articles 30 and 36 serve to define the limits on which infringing acts common 
to all intellectual property rights may not be relied upon to prevent free 
movement of goods throughout the Community. This has important 
consequences for the marketing strategy of any business dependent upon 
intellectual property and is a matter that therefore requires detailed 
investigation when any interest in intellectual property is acquired. Due 
diligence w i l l focus on the need to ensure that a strategy is adopted that 
maximises the profit potential of intellectual property. This might involve 
withholding sales f rom markets that are subject to low prices i f they would 
undercut sales in other markets where high prices prevail (following parallel 
importation into the higher priced markets). Articles 30 and 36 also have 
implications for due diligence enquiry of businesses engaged in parallel 
importation of goods embodying third party intellectual property, to determine 
the extent to which parallel importation is possible, against the wishes of the 
intellectual property owner. 
Articles 85(1) and 86 are Treaty provisions which apply primarily in a 
different arena, namely, competition law. Articles 85(1) and 86 determine the 
contractual terms and other practices by which intellectual property may be 
exploited, once again imposing limits on what would otherwise be the f u l l 
commercial freedom of the proprietor or licensee. As Treaty provisions, they 
deserve comment in Chapter Two. However, as the permitted terms of 
exploitation in agreements caught by the Article 85(1) prohibition have been 
clarified by the European Commission by means of Commission Regulation, 
the bulk of the discussion on the subject of Articles 85(1) and 86 w i l l be found 
in Chapter Three, which focuses on Commission initiatives by way of 
Regulation. 
D. R E G U L A T I O N S 
Two Regulations concerning the application of Article 85(1) to selected 
intellectual property agreements w i l l be examined (patent and know-how 
licences f i r s t \ and research and development agreements next^) with 
particular regard to the obstacles they create to a clear determination of 
enforceability as a matter of competition law. Any party to an intellectual 
property agreement (whether the proprietor or licensee) w i l l want to ensure, 
for example, that the terms of territorial exclusivity w i l l be upheld, and the 
proprietor in particular w i l l want to ensure the enforceability of other 
contractual terms aimed to protect the value of intellectual property. 
The role of Regulations in Chapter Three is seen to be positive and necessary 
given the theoretical breadth of Article 85(1) but the task of due diligence, of 
confirming the enforceability and protection of the commercial value of 
intellectual property rights, is considered to be greatly hampered by the 
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements (1996) OJ L31/1 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements (1985) OJ L53/5 
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narrowness of Regulations. The Commission's approach is considered to be 
insufficiently generous and clear for this purpose. 
E . D I R E C T I V E S 
The final chapter. Chapter Four, w i l l consider the value of Council Directives 
as more specific measures aimed at harmonisation and the realisation of the 
internal market by removing obstacles based on differences between national 
levels of intellectual property protection. Directives ultimately determine 
(when enacted in national legislation) the scope of protection available to the 
proprietor. As an assessment of the commercial value of intellectual property 
in the hands of the proprietor (or licensee) is at the heart of due diligence, the 
impact for due diligence of the changes introduced by the chosen Directives 
w i l l be examined. Three Directives w i l l be selected for this purpose. The 
Directive concerned with software protection^ has been chosen since it was 
the first in a series of Directives targeted at the harmonisation of copyright. 
Its significant limitations w i l l be highlighted but that Directive w i l l be 
compared favourably against the later Directive'' which attempted to 
harmonise the duration of copyright protection throughout the Community. 
It is submitted that the later Directive has made the process of due diligence 
so complicated as to be virtually unattainable, certainly impracticable, even 
i f it achieves certain theoretical aims. 
Finally, the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological materials^ 
has been chosen as a means of taking this review f u l l circle. It illustrates the 
tendency, with emerging technologies, for legislation to adhere to established 
patterns of intellectual property protection rather than sui generis protection, 
^ Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (1991) 
OJ LI22/42 
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the terms of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights (1993) OJ L290/9 
^ Council Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (1998) OJ L213/98 
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perhaps wrongly. It illustrates the need for Directives to take fu l l account of 
other sources of law. In the case of the Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological materials, the appropriateness of protection based upon the 
European Patents Convention 1973 w i l l be examined. 
F . S U M M A R Y 
In short, this study w i l l examine the effectiveness of harmonisation measures 
beginning briefly with the initial steps towards international cooperation, 
before proceeding with a more detailed examination of Community-specific 
measures in the form of the Treaty, the most important landmark as far as 
treaty cooperation is concerned, giving rise in due course to Regulations and 
Directives. The effectiveness of such measures w i l l be examined for their 
impact (intended or unintended) on the commercial value of intellectual 
property and the process of due diligence evaluation. 
C H A P T E R ONE: 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O O P E R A T I O N 
"He who wants to know himself should offend two or three of his neighbours" 
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I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O O P E R A T I O N 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Certain international cooperation in the sphere of intellectual property has 
taken place independendy of the aims of achieving the internal market 
pursuant to the Treaty of Rome ("the Treaty"), (for example, the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, revised 
Paris, July 1971 ("the Berne Convention")) and is responsible for some of the 
present obstacles to Community harmonisation. Even international 
cooperation undertaken with Community harmonisation as one of its express 
aims has been piecemeal and only partially effective. This chapter aims to 
introduce those examples of international cooperation whose legacy, in the 
context of the Community-specific measures, has been to hamper 
harmonisation as discussed in the chapters that fo l low. 
B . T H E B E R N E C O N V E N T I O N 
The Berne Convention took the initiative m international cooperation by 
minimum standard-setting in the field of copyright throughout and beyond 
Europe. The Berne Convention is one of the first (and surviving) examples 
of trans-national regulation of intellectual property and is still being revised 
to take account of emerging technologies^. 
One of the most important principles established in the Berne Convention is 
that of "national treatment". It is the requirement that contracting states give 
to foreign authors of qualifying works the same level of protection that they 
confer on their own nationals. Of critical importance in the Berne Convention 
are the derogations to that principle. The first is that of "reciprocity" which 
6 Discussions continue amongst a Committee of Experts at the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
to address the issue of new digital technologies, particularly gaps that exist in the protection of works 
delivered and used by electronic transmission 
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7 
entitles Berne Union countries to reduce the level of protection given to the 
works of an author of a non-Union country, to the level prevailing in that non-
union country. In turn, i f a Union country takes advantage of the principle 
of reciprocity against the non-Union country to reduce the level of protection, 
other Union countries may similarly reduce the level of protection offered to 
the non-Union national, irrespective of whether the works of their own 
nationals are adequately protected in the non-Union country'. 
The Berne Convention remains the cornerstone of copyright protection 
internationally. In spite of the Directives that will be discussed at length in 
Chapter Four, copyright remains an area in which the substantive law is 
harmonised least, giving rise to anomalies concerning the exhaustion of those 
rights and insuperable difficulties in the due diligence task. 
T H E EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 
International cooperation in the field of patents came in the form of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty 1970 (the "PCT"), which was established to coordinate 
patent searches. Its purpose was to overcome many of the variances that 
existed across national patent systems with patents of different scope filed in 
different languages. The PCT, in short, assisted the search for prior art. It 
is therefore largely procedural. I f an application is made under the PCT, a 
so-called "international application" will ultimately result in national patents 
(rather than in an international patent). Searches will identify the viability of 
the application for novelty and obviousness and avoid wastage of costs. After 
the searches are made, the international application is passed to the 
appropriate national patent offices. 
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents (the "EPC") was the first 
substantive measure taken in the field of patents to harmonise national patent 
Article 6 of the Berne Convention 
laws, even though patents continue to be granted and maintained nationally. 
The EPC resulted in an alternative route for patent applications involving the 
national patent offices of all countries (as before) and in addition the European 
Patent Office (the "EPO") in Munich which administers the grant of 
"European patents" in which various European countries may be designated 
for patent protection. A European patent does not in fact exist as such; it 
consists of a national patent in one country with matching sister patents in 
other European countries^. 
There therefore presently exist two parallel procedures for applying for 
patents. The purely national British system and the EPO system. Both may 
be pursued simultaneously although the British patent is cancelled when the 
EPO grants a European patent with the United Kingdom as a designated 
country. The EPO system has the advantage of being cheaper for multi-
country designations (since a single translation will suffice until grant whereas 
each national system will require the application in its own language) but is 
generally slower than national systems, and suffers the disadvantage that 
single specification applications may not take ful l advantage of the differences 
that exist between the national patent systems. 
The EPC has resulted in procedures for streamlining patent applications and 
has greatly facilitated the assessment of the likelihood of success of patent 
applications in numerous countries. However, for so long as there exist 
substantive variances in eligibility for patent protection and patent scope, 
patent law remains unharmonised. Also, for so long as the "first to invent" 
systems such as in the United States and the "first to file" systems in Europe 
The E P C also contemplates a single patent across a single European territory (unlike European patents 
which are still a collection of national patents). This is not yet in force in spite of revision in 1989 
( C M N D 1452) to provide for a uniform appeal procedure on issues of validity and infringement. The 
greatest obstacle is the requirement for translations to be available in each Community state in the 
official language which is cost prohibitive unless applications are ultimately intended to be filed in all 
of those countries 
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and much of the rest of the world are uiiharmonised the value of the EPC is 
inevitably limited. 
D. T H E PARIS CONVENTION, GATT AND TRIPS 
The pressures for ensuring overseas protection for intellectual property and 
non-discrimination overseas led to the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, 1883 (Revised at Stockholm, 1967) (the "Paris 
Convention") and also the principle of national treatment in the field of 
patents, trade marks and industrial designs. That principle is summarised in 
Article 2(1) as follows: 
"Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection 
of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the 
advantages that their respective laws now grant or may hereafter grant 
to nationals." 
There are presently 133 members of the Union. Important as the principle of 
national treatment is, the Paris Convention does not regulate or even attempt 
to harmonise the level of protection to be given by each member country 
except to a limited degree. For patents, designs and trade marks, the Paris 
Convention established a priority procedure for determining the priority date 
to be given to applications for registration made in Union countries. Little, 
however, is said in the Paris Convention concerning patent eligibility or 
principles of morality, obviousness, duration or infringing acts, nor of the 
eligibility rules for trade mark protection. 
The importance of the principle of national treatment should not be 
underestimated given that it has also been formally adopted by the World 
Trade Organisation (the "WTO") which came into effect on Ist January 
-10-
1995^ The WTO replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT"). Members of the WTO agreed in Article 3(1) of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") as 
follows: 
"Each member shall accord to nationals of other members treatment 
no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard 
to the protection of intellectual property." 
Although the Paris Convention did not provide for minimum standards of 
protection or any substantive provisions which might lead to harmonisation of 
the laws of members countries. Article 1 of the TRIPs Agreement does 
impose obligations on member countries to provide minimum standards of 
protection in domestic law and these are elaborated in Part I I , concerning 
eligibility for protection, scope of protection and subject matter, relating to 
patents, trade marks and industrial designs. Part I I I goes on to deal with 
enforcement measures by both nationals and foreigners. 
At 1st March 1998 less than 23% of the 130 WTO members had implemented 
those minimum standards of protection'". Compliance may not be complete 
until 2006. Even if that response might be regarded as disappointing, TRIPs 
will ultimately give a greater level of uniformity of protection than the Paris 
Convention or even the TRIPs predecessor, GATT. The result is cooperation 
at a rudimentary level to avoid discrimination between nationals and 
foreigners in order to encourage all participating countries to conform their 
laws of protection of intellectual property, and ultimately to facilitate trade 
between those countries. 
10 
Convention Establishing the World Trade Organisation 
W T O website http://www.wto.org March 1998 
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International cooperation in the field of intellectual property by means of the 
Berne and Paris Conventions and most recently by GATT and TRIPs therefore 
forms the essential backdrop to the more detailed discussion which follows 
concerning the European measures taken to establish and maintain the internal 
market and are supplemented by the provisions of the International Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (the "Rome Convention") and the Protocol Relating to the 
Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Trade Marks 
(the "Madrid Protocol"). It is interesting to note furthermore that neither 
GATT nor TRIPs contains anything inconsistent with principles of exhaustion 
of intellectual property (discussed in Chapter Two). In fact, Annex IC of 
TRIPs expressly states that (provided that the rules of national treatment and 
most favoured nation treatment are preserved): 
"for the purpose of dispute settlement ... nothing in this Agreement 
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights."" 
E . SOURCES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ("EC") LAW 
EC law has various sources which operate in different ways. The ultimate 
and originating source is the Treaty. The aims and organs of the Treaty are 
established in Articles 1 to 8. Article 2 expresses these aims succinctly: 
"The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the 
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
Article 6 of T R I P s 
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standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to 
it ." 
In order to give effect to these ambitions. Article 5 of the Treaty provides 
that: 
"Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general 
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty or resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the 
Community." 
"12 
12 
This duty also includes "sincere cooperation 
Part Two of the Treaty establishes the principle of free movement, the central 
Article for these purposes being Article 30 that guarantees free movement of 
goods: 
"Preventative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall.... be prohibited between Member States." 
The Single European Act of 1986 added Article 8 which expresses the 
additional aim of establishing the internal market by 1992 without internal 
frontiers to the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital. All 
impediments to free trade throughout the Community must therefore be 
removed. 
Free movement is also accomplished by means of the competition principles 
established in Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty which prohibit practices that 
restrict competition or constitute an abuse of dominant position. A 
considerable amount of EC law has developed, concerning such matters as the 
Commission v Greece Case 68/88 [1989] E C R 2965 
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scope and duration of licence exclusivity and other contractual terms for 
exploiting intellectual property in line with those competition principles. 
The Treaty also gives rise (under Article 189) to secondary legislation in the 
form of Council Directives ("Directives") (which direct Member States to 
enact their own legislation by a specified date to achieve a stated objective, 
but as a generality themselves have no direct effect), Commission Regulations 
("Regulations") (which do have direct effect, without national enactment). 
Decisions (which amount to binding rulings on particular matters, usually 
given a narrow sphere of competence) and, finally. Recommendations and 
Opinions (which are not binding but are nevertheless influential)". The 
supremacy of EC law is now recognised even in the case of direct conflict 
(MacCarthv's Ltd v Smith)"'. 
It is striking that the Treaty itself makes no mention of intellectual property 
other than in Article 36 which permits restrictions on free movement of goods 
if justified on the grounds of protection of "industrial and commercial 
property". The principle of free movement of goods ostensibly conflicts with 
the national protection afforded to intellectual property against "importation" 
as an infringing act, and Article 30 resolves the conflict. The interpretation 
of Article 36 has given rise to considerable case law from the European Court 
of Justice ("ECJ") to determine the extent to which intellectual property rights 
may be exempt from the free movement principle of Article 36. 
13 
14 
The status of Directives is an interesting one, in particular, the extent to which they give rise to rights 
at a national level before their implementation. The case of Alfons Lutticke GmbH v Hauptzoilampt 
Sarreloins [1996] E C R 205 established that a Directive is binding on national courts if its provisions 
impose a clear and precise obligation on Member States, it is unconditional (or subject to very clearly 
defined exceptions) and the Member State is given no discretion whether or not to apply it. These 
principles are not confined to Directives, but Directives are the most common source of claims for direct 
effect in national courts, for example, where the national legislature is slow in implementing Directive 
obligations which favour a Plaintiff. 
[1979] I C R 785; [1979] 3 C M L R 44 
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Finally, the Treaty established as the main organs of administration, the 
Council of Ministers ("the Council"), the Commission of the European 
Communities ("the Commission"), the European Parliament ("the Parliament") 
and the ECJ. The Council's aim is to ensure coordination of economic 
p o l i c y T h e Commission acts as the guardian of the Treaty, monitoring 
compliance and also instigating much legislation by means of Proposals which 
are put to the Council for consideration. The Parliament assumes a 
consultative function in its legislative role, requiring the Council to consult the 
Parliament in draft legislation. The Court of First Instance was established 
to hear appeals against decisions by the Commission and to review 
Commission decisions concerning penalties (under Article 173). Finally, the 
ECJ is concerned with Treaty compliance and the "interpretation and 
application" of the law'^ and has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on 
such matters'"' assisted by the Advocate-General whose non-binding opinion 
is given on all cases before the ECJ. 
T H E EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA AGREEMENT 
More limited co-operation than established by the Treaty was achieved by 
countries comprising the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA"), formed 
in 1960. By 1989, the need became apparent for the inter-relation between 
the EFTA and EC countries to be formalised and in 1992 the European 
Economic Area Agreement ("the EEA Agreement") was signed. The parties 
to the EEA Agreement are the EC, EC Member States and EFTA countries'* 
and the geographical coverage of the European Economic Area (the "EEA") 
is the territory represented by those countries. The EFTA Agreement applies 
Article 145 of the Treaty 
Article 164 of the Treaty 
Article 177 of the Treaty 
Article 2(c) E F T A Agreement 
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the basic principles of free movement of goods and services to the EFTA 
states'^  by reflecting in Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the EEA Agreement the 
provisions of Articles 30, 34 and 36 of the Treaty. It also applies similar 
competition rules by reflecting in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement 
the substance of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
However, although a great body of text of EC law is adopted by annex to the 
EEA Agreement ("acquis communautaire of the EEA Agreement"), the 
interpretation to be given to the EEA Agreement differs from that given by 
the ECJ to the Treaty provisions because the objectives of the Treaty, unlike 
the EEA Agreement, are the achievement of the internal market and the other 
aims outlined above. Even if the text of certain crucial provisions of the EEA 
Agreement and Treaty are identical, their interpretation may be different^". 
The core provision of the EEA Agreement concerned with intellectual 
property is Protocol 28 which requires members to render their national law 
compatible with EC law on such matters as the level of intellectual property 
protection to be conferred on proprietors, free movement and exhaustion of 
rights as developed by the ECJ. Article 3 of Protocol 28 also requires the 
EPC provisions to be met in substance, and Article 5 requires compliance with 
the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention and Rome Convention. 
The inter-relation between the Treaty and the EEA Agreement can give rise 
to anomalies and difficulties of interpretation. Protocol 28 of the EEA 
Agreement provides as follows: 
19 
20 
Currently Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
Opinion delivered pursuant to the second sub-paragraph of Article 228(1) of the Treaty, Opinion 1/91 
[1991] E C R 1-6079 
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"To the extent that exhaustion is dealt with in Community measures or 
jurisprudence, the Contracting Parties shall provide for such exhaustion 
of intellectual property rights as laid down in Community law."^' 
It is clear from the advisory opinion of the EFTA Court in Mag Instrument 
Inc v California Trading Company Norway Ulsteen^^ that: 
"The purpose and scope of the EC Treaty and the EEA Agreement are 
different ... the EEA Agreement does not establish a customs union 
but a free trade area ... the principle of free movement of goods as 
laid down in Articles 11 to 13 EEA applies to goods originating in the 
EEA, while in the Community a product is in free circulation once it 
has been lawfully placed on the market in a Member State. In general 
the latter only applies in the context of the EEA only in respect of 
products originating in the EEA. In the case at hand, the product was 
manufactured in the United States and imported into Norway. 
Accordingly it is not subject to the principle of the free movement of 
goods within the EEA."^^ 
It was therefore a matter for the EFTA countries to determine their own 
policy concerning international exhaustion in relation to goods originating 
outside the EEA. They remain free to enter bilateral or multilateral treaties 
with third countries for the purpose of that trade and this might conceivably 
create anomalies in future with the principles of exhaustion if developed by 
the ECJ in a maimer inconsistent with those treaties. 
21 
22 
23 
Article 2(1) 
Case E - 2/97 advisory opinion of 3 December 1997 
Paragraphs 25 and 26 
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SUMMARY 
All of the above instruments have played a crucial role in shaping the law of 
intellectual property, at certain points eroding intellectual property rights, at 
others obscuring them, but at all times the purpose of EC law has, to one 
degree or another, been that of achieving harmonisation throughout the 
Community. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
HARMONISATION BY TREATY 
(ARTICLES 30 AND 36: F R E E MOVEMENT OF GOODS) 
"Buy at a fair, but sell at home" 
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HARMONISATION BY T R E A T Y 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Harmonisation of intellectual property has been necessary because of 
significant differences that have existed (and continue to exist) in the national 
laws of Member States, not only concerning activities within their boundaries 
(infringement) but activities outside as well (exhaustion). While that process 
(which is largely achieved by means of Directive and discussed in Chapter 
Four) continues, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") interprets and 
enforces the provisions of the Treaty of Rome ("the Treaty") in such a way 
as to balance the free movement requirements of Article 30 of the Treaty with 
the requirements of intellectual protection recognised in Article 36. 
1. Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome 
The scope of any monopoly or quasi-monopoly conferred nationally by means 
of intellectual property protection must be read subject to the principles of free 
movement established in Article 30 of the Treaty. Article 30 has already been 
referred to but requires elaboration. It contains a simple prohibition against 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports between Member States as 
well as measures having equivalent effect. The language is so broad ("all 
restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect shall... be 
prohibited between Member States") that it is necessary to make an exception 
for intellectual property rights which typically include as infringing acts the 
act of importation. For example, infringement occurs on the importation of 
infringing copies of a design in the case of copyright and design right 
works^ "*, the importation of infringing products falling within product or 
process patent claims of the country of importation^^ the importation of 
24 
25 
Sections 22 and 227 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 
Sections 60(l)(a) and 60(l)(c) of the Patents Act 1997 
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goods bearing a registered trade mark of the country of importation^^ or the 
importation of goods to which a registered design of the country of 
importation has been applied^^. The ban on importation without the consent 
of the rights holder is clearly a matter caught by Article 30. 
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome provides the necessary gateway for the 
exercise of intellectual property rights. Article 36 reads, 
"The provisions of Article 30 [to 34] shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
of public morality, public policy, or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions 
or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction of trade between Member 
States." 
At the heart of what is termed the "doctrine of exhaustion" is the inter-relation 
between the non-importation restrictions of intellectual property rights and 
Articles 30 and 36. In the early case of Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft 
mbh v Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG^^ the ECJ stated, 
"I f a right...is relied upon to prevent the marketing in a Member State 
of products distributed by the holder of the right or with his consent 
on the territory of another Member State on the sole grounds that such 
distribution did not take place on the national territory, such a 
prohibition, which would legitimise the isolation of national markets. 
Section 10(4)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 
Section 7 of the Registered Designs Act 1949 as amended by Section 268 C P D A 1988 
Case 78/70 [1971] E C R 487 
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would be repugnant to the essential purpose of the Treaty, which is to 
unite national markets into a single market."^' 
It is to be noted that Article 222 of the Treaty preserves the national effect of 
intellectual property law by stating that it shall "in no way prejudice the rules 
in Member States governing the system of property ownership". 
2. National Intellectual Property Laws 
Intellectual property is territorial in nature, formulated and enforced by the 
laws of the state which confers protection. For example, a patent offers 
protection on the patentee only in the country in which the patent has been 
granted. At its widest, a patent is only national in scope (to prevent things 
being done in that state) in spite of the European Patent Convention ("EPC") 
harmonisation measures and even terminology which refers to a "European 
Patent". Protection is merely conferred state by state in territories according 
to the rules of each state which confer monopoly or quasi-monopoly 
protection^". 
Each state has also historically developed principles concerning the point at 
which those rights are said to be exhausted. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, once a patented product is sold, the purchaser could deal with it 
anywhere in the world subject only to restrictions of which the purchaser is 
given notice (Betts v Willmott)^'. 
"When a man has purchased an article he expects to have control over 
it, and there must be some clear and explicit agreement to the contrary 
29 
30 
31 
Paragraph 12 
The only Community-wide right is the Community Trade Mark which became obtainable in 1996. 
Council Regulation ( E C ) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (1994) OJ L 
11/1 
[1870] L R 6 C h App 239 
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to justify the vendor in saying that he has not given the purchaser his 
consent to sell the article, or to use it wherever he pleases as against 
himself."'^ 
Betts V Willmott is clearly an old case and must now be read subject to the 
limits on the freedom of patentees to impose contractual restrictions under 
Articles 85(1) and 85(3) of the Treaty. Nevertheless, Betts v Willmott does 
reflect the general principle in the United Kingdom that once sold anywhere 
in the world, any subsequent use of a patented product will not amount to 
infringement. As a result, once goods are first marketed, in the absence of 
lawful contractual restrictions, the purchaser and others in the supply chain 
following the purchaser are free to deal in the goods without their activities 
amounting to infringement. However, an implied licence is only to be taken 
as granted by the patentee, and not an assignee or licensee of the patentee 
(Manufacturers de Glaces SA v Tilghman's Patent Sound Blast Company)^^. 
The principles stated in Betts v Willmott (and in subsequent cases^ '*) have 
been confirmed more recently in Roussel Uclaf SA v Hocklev International 
Limited & Another-^ ^ in which Jacob J. stated that it is open to the patentee 
to stipulate limitations on any implied licence and these will be binding on the 
person supplied, as well as on subsequent dealers in the product, provided that 
notice of those limitations is brought to the attention of every person down the 
chain. This judgment is not immune from criticism^* and reflects a Common 
Law approach to the doctrine of exhaustion. Applied at the national level, the 
Penultimate paragraph of the Judgment at page 245 
[1884] 25 C h D l 
National Phonographic Co of Australia v Menck [19111 28 R P C 229: Gillette v Bernstein [19421 1 C h D 
45 
[1996] R P C 441 
For example, it is at odds with the decision in Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Isler [1906] R P C 173 
that "if a person innocently buys a patented invention from a licensee and uses it not knowing that there 
are limits on the licence . . . he is equally an infringer" 
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doctrine in effect results in worldwide exhaustion, subject only to limits on 
any implied licence that are effectively imposed by notice on dealers to 
prevent export or reimportation. 
By contrast, many continental European countries (such as Germany) have 
resisted any concept of international exhaustion of patents, preferring instead 
to entitle the patentee to resist imports of products first sold outside their 
borders. 
Inconsistency has therefore developed across the national laws of Member 
States concerning the application of principles of exhaustion; in particular 
whether international exhaustion is to be recognised and, if so, to what extent. 
In some countries (again Germany), international exhaustion has not been 
applied in the case of patents but has in the case of trade marks (at least until 
the implementation of Council Directive 89/104 EEC to approximate the laws 
of Member States relating to trade marks" (the "Trademark Directive")). 
Inconsistency within nation systems adds to the inconsistencies that already 
exist across different national systems. 
The Emergence of Exhaustion under Articles 30 to 36 
It is striking that the doctrine of exhaustion developed by ECJ case law on the 
subject of Articles 30 to 36 has historically focused little attention on the 
operation of the national law. The case of Silhouette Internationale Schmied 
GmbH and Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH^^ ("the Silhouette 
Case") highlighted the fact that the effect of inconsistent national treatment of 
international exhaustion would be that, 
37 
38 
OJ (1989) L 40/1 
Case - 355/96 [1998] Judgment of the Court Transcript 16 July 1998 
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"the same products could be the subject of parallel imports into one 
Member State but not into another, a result incompatible with the 
internal market."^^ 
The ECJ's historic insistence upon confining its case law under Articles 30 to 
36 to the immediate context of the Community, as confirmed in EMI Records 
V CBS United Kingdom'*", rather than the world market, might be criticised 
for its conservatism, especially given the barriers that manifestly result 
between Member States if they are permitted to adopt different rules for 
international exhaustion under national law: 
"The exercise of the trade mark right in order to prevent the marketing 
of products coming from a third country under an identical mark, even 
if this constitutes a measure having an equivalent effect to a quantative 
restriction, does not affect the free movement of goods between 
Member States and thus does not come under the prohibition set out 
in Article 30 et seq of the Treaty.""^ 
The clarification of the position of different national rules, fundamental to the 
achievement of a single market, is a significant recent advance in the 
development of the doctrine of exhaustion under Articles 30 to 36. 
The following sections of this chapter will analyse the effect of the application 
of Articles 30 to 36 upon the value and scope of intellectual property 
protection, the need to establish a marketing strategy that takes best advantage 
of Articles 30 to 36 and the consequences for due diligence assessment, taking 
in turn patents, copyright, registered designs and trade marks. 
Paragraph 42 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 29 January 1998 
Case 51/75 [1976] E C R 811 
Issue 2 paragraph 10 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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B. PATENTS 
The Significance of the Patent Monopoly 
The commercial pressure for parallel imports and patent protection are best 
illustrated by the market factors that apply in the pharmaceutical industry, for 
three main reasons. First, the costs of research, development and of obtaining 
regulatory approval are considerable for bringing a medicinal product to 
market and accordingly the price of pharmaceutical products (and therefore 
potential profit) is generally high. The start up costs and other barriers to 
entry for a would-be parallel importer are low. Secondly, pharmaceutical 
products are generally small, light and easily transported, making them a 
ready candidate for cross-border trade. Thirdly, the incentive for parallel 
importation exists in many countries because of price differentials that have 
resulted from government price control measures adopted pursuant to their 
national healthcare policies. The price of products in one country may 
therefore be fixed at a level considerably higher than that in a neighbouring 
country. Price differentials are likely to be further accentuated by variations 
in patent protection available in different countries. In general, prices for 
pharmaceuticals will be lower in unpatented countries because no patent 
royalties are payable on their sales. This is demonstrated by the drop in 
prices that typically occurs when products become generic upon expiry of their 
patents. 
An essential part of the formulation of any marketing strategy will be the 
selection of countries for patent protection and subsequent maintenance. The 
patent strategy is crucial to research and development in the pharmaceutical 
industry in which product development may last a decade or more before a 
single sale is made, in which the number of drug "hits" is extremely low when 
compared to the "misses" and where the patent term is relatively short given 
that the underlying inventions are often made, and the patent term 
commences, many years before the product may be marketed. The result is 
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43 
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that a significant proportion of the patent term and corresponding patent filing 
and maintenance expense is occupied with pre-sales research and development, 
clinical trials, regulatory approval and similar. Supplementary Protection 
Certificates under Regulation 1768/92"^ go some way towards extending the 
life of pharmaceutical patents beyond their normal term in recognition of the 
long gestation period of patented pharmaceutical products. Regulation 
1768/92 was aimed at prospering the pharmaceutical industry but in line with 
a programme of harmonisation heralded by the European Patents Convention 
("EPC")''^ Nevertheless, the lack of uniformity in the national patent law 
of Member States, compounded by government price intervention has led to 
the testing of the principles of exhaustion in a number of cases concerning 
pharmaceutical patents. It has become clear that the policy of the ECJ in such 
cases has been to construe any derogation from Article 30 (under Article 36) 
very strictly through adherence to notions of the "specific subject matter" of 
intellectual property". 
The "Specific Subject Matter" of Patents 
In "Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc"*^ 
("Centrafann v Sterling Drug"), the ECJ held that a claim of patent 
infringement could only be used as the basis of preventing importation of 
goods if necessary to protect the "specific subject matter" of the intellectual 
property. The "specific subject matter" of a patent differs from what might 
be described as the "function" of a patent. The function of a patent has been 
described as "a temporary exclusive right on a new product or process to 
reward ... creative effort".''^ The limits to the exercise of that exclusive 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for medicinal products, (1992) OJ L182/1 
See for example the measures discussed in Section 5 below 
Case 15/74 [1974] E C R 1147; [1974] 2 CMLR 480 
1 Govaere "The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in E C Law" 1996 paragraph 4.24 
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right were spelled out in Centrafarm v Sterling Drug in the statement by the 
ECJ that, 
"a derogation from the principle of free movement is not, however, 
justified where the product has been brought onto the market in a 
lawful manner by the patentee himself or with his consent in the 
Member State from which it has been imported, in particular in the 
case of a proprietor of parallel patents."''^  
The issue of consent has its origins in the recognition that the patentee alone 
has the right to do, or authorise others to do, anything that would otherwise 
amount to patent infringement, including sales and importation. The right to 
first market (which encompasses both sales and importation) is not however 
exhausted when the patentee does not exercise that marketing choice 
voluntarily, as in Pharmon v Hoechst" ,^ in which the reimported goods had 
been marketed pursuant to a compulsory patent licence because, 
"such a measure deprives the patent proprietor of his right to 
determine freely the conditions under which he markets his 
products."*^ 
Consent is obviously adequately given by a proprietor by means of a licence 
or assignment. Consent is also considered to be given between entities under 
common control (Centrafarm v Sterling Drug). 
The concept of the "specific subject matter" of a patent has acquired resilience 
through testing in awkward cases, particularly those in which the ECJ has 
considered it necessary to decide in favour of the free movement of goods. 
Issue 2, paragraph 11 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Case 19/84 [1985] E C R 2281; [1985] 3 CMLR 775 
Issue 2, paragraph 25 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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thereby undermining the economic value of patents. The ECJ has done so 
even where market distortions are caused by government intervention. 
Governmental Distortions 
At the heart of the doctrine of exhaustion is the policy aim of allowing free 
movement of goods in accordance with market forces with the effect, among 
other things, of levelling price differentials across Member States. In the case 
of pharmaceutical products, government intervention may take the form of 
control of the prices of healthcare products or may take the form of legislation 
that is inconsistent with the rest of the Community in relation to the patenting 
of pharmaceutical products. 
a. Price Controls 
In Centrafarm v Sterling Drug it was accepted that a price differential 
of 50% that existed between the country of first sale and the country 
of resale was the result of government price determination. 
Nevertheless the ECJ was not prepared to allow Article 30 to be 
sacrificed in order to accommodate distortions caused by governmental 
measures. 
"It is part of the Community authorities' task to eliminate 
factors likely to distort competition between Member States, in 
particular by the harmonisation of national measures for the 
control of prices and by the prohibition of aids which are 
incompatible with the Common Market, in addition to the 
exercise of their powers in the field of competition.""*' 
49 Paragraph 23 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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This immediately calls into question whether a patent may still 
properly be regarded as an incentive for the investment required for 
industrial invention. Many statements of the ECJ suggest that it may. 
For example in Centrafarm v Sterling Drug the ECJ recognised (in the 
case of patents): 
"that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor 
has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to 
manufacturing industrial products and putting them into 
circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of 
licences to third parties, as well as the right to oppose 
infringements. 
However, the erosion of patent rewards is manifest in the ECJ's 
decisions concerning government-imposed anomalies that result from 
price controls and patent policy. 
Non-uniformity of Patent Protection 
In the cases of Merck & Co Inc.. Merck Sharp & Dohme Ltd and 
Merck Sharp & Dohme International Services BV v Primecrown Ltd. 
Ketan Himatlal Mehta. Bharat Himatlal Mehta and Necessity Supplies 
Ltd and Beecham Group pic v Europharm of Worthing Ltd^' ("Merck 
V Primecrown"). government interference created anomalies in the 
patent laws of Member States following the accession of Portugal and 
Spain. The case raised a number of fundamental issues concerning the 
scope and extent of the doctrine of exhaustion and gave the ECJ the 
opportunity to review its existing policy. 
Paragraph 9 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95 [1996] E C R 1-6285 
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The review began with the interpretation of the ECJ's judgment in the 
case of Merck & Co Inc v Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus Exler^^ 
("Merck v Stephar"'). In that case, Merck held patents in the 
Netherlands for a pharmaceutical product, but not in Italy, where 
patents were not then available. Merck claimed to be entitled to 
prevent imports from Italy on the basis that no rights can be said to be 
exhausted where they do not exist. The ECJ rejected this argument on 
the grounds that Merck had freely chosen to market the products in 
Italy. Patent rights could not be invoked to prevent parallel 
importation of goods sold, even in unpatented territories, by the patent 
proprietor or with his consent. Considerable emphasis was placed on 
the choice of first marketing in that case. 
"It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide, in the light of 
all the circumstances, under what conditions he will market his 
product, including the possibility of marketing it in a Member 
State where the law does not provide patent protection for the 
product in question. I f he decides to do so he must then accept 
the consequences of his choice as regards the free movement of 
the product within the common market, which is a fundamental 
principle forming part of the legal and economic circumstances 
which must be taken into account by the proprietor of the 
patent in determining the manner in which his exclusive right 
will be exercised."^^ 
The fundamental issue in Merck v Primecrown was whether Merck v 
Stephar was good law. Similar facts arose in Merck v Primecrown 
except that Merck relied on patents held in the United Kingdom to 
prevent importation from Spain and Portugal where pharmaceuticals 
Case 187/80 [1981] E C R 2063 [1981]; 3 CMLR 465 
Paragraph 11 of the Judgment of the ECJ (emphasis added) 
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were not at the relevant time patentable under the laws of those 
countries in spite of their accession to the European Community. 
Maximum prices were set at extremely low levels. Although the 
products were marketed in Spain and Portugal with their consent, 
Merck argued that patent rights could not thereby be said to be 
exhausted. They also claimed that the principle in Merck v Stephar 
should be limited in the case of pharmaceutical manufacturers because: 
i . the effects of price control legislation in one country are 
otherwise exported to other Member States (following Pharmon 
V Hoechst)^*; 
i i . the monopoly revenues of the pharmaceutical industry would be 
sufficiently undermined at a time when EC measures had been 
supportive of the industry by means of the Supplementary 
Protection Certificate; 
i i i . there is at least an ethical obligation to make medicinal 
products available which does not leave pharmaceutical 
companies free choice to withhold them as part of a marketing 
strategy from unpatented countries. 
The ECJ ruled that the fact that the products were unpatentable in 
Spain and Portugal but were in the United Kingdom could not be the 
basis for preventing imports of products from Spain and Portugal into 
the United Kingdom. The ECJ adopted what might be said to be a 
formal and legalist approach to these issues and refused to adjust the 
ratio of the Merck v Stephar decision founded on the principle that the 
patentee has free marketing choice and must bear the consequences of 
It was noted in Pharmon v Hoechst (n. 47 above) that schemes for compulsory licences are a matter for 
national legislation and that if the doctrine of exhaustion were to apply to permit exports of products 
made under a compulsory licence it would amount, in effect, to exporting the national patent legislation 
concerning compulsory licences 
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that choice. The special circumstances pleaded for pharmaceutical 
companies did not qualify for a derogation from the rule in Merck v 
Stephar. However the ECJ commented that exceptions would be 
allowed in the case of marketing in a Member State under genuine 
existing legal obligations. Mandatory price control in Member States 
did not fall within that exception, nor did a mere ethical obligation. 
At this point, two observations should be made. First, the ECJ is 
likely to have been persuaded that the problem caused by the 
transitional provisions relating to the accession of Spain and Portugal 
was one unlikely to dog the pharmaceutical industry for long since all 
Member States now allow for patentability of pharmaceutical products 
and the facts of Merck v Primecrown are unlikely to be repeated. 
However, the effects of the Merck v Primecrown decision are likely 
to be felt for the patent life of those products which are caught by the 
transitional provisions relating to the accession of Spain and Portugal, 
or any other country in the future acceding with patent laws which are 
unharmonised. Anomalies of accession are likely to be significant 
given that at present ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
have applied for membership of the European Union^^. 
Secondly, the ECJ did not pursue an issue canvassed at some length by 
Advocate General Fennelly in Merck v Primecrown concerning the 
consequences of their decision in relation to the marketing plans of 
pharmaceutical companies. This is especially important given that the 
central issue in Merck v Primecrown is not purely an historic one. 
"The current logical implications of Merck v Stephar not only 
encourage pharmaceutical companies to partition Spain and 
Portugal from the rest of the Community by withdrawing from 
"Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe 1997, European Commission" 
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those markets, but this also constitutes a potential copyists' 
charter for those two markets which will last at least until 
research orientated pharmaceutical companies are able to bring 
through to the marketing stage on those markets novel and 
therefore patentable products."^^ 
Return from Investment and the Significance of Choice 
The case is a significant development of the law concerning the patentee's 
return on investment and the effects of the decision are vital in the process of 
any due diligence investigation. The patentee under a compulsory licence at 
least has royalty revenue from the licence. The case of Merck v Primecrown 
concerns acts that would amount to infringement but for the lack of patent 
legislation in conformity with Community standards and results in no royalty 
return to the patentee in countries of first marketing. This has consequences 
for the patent system itself and raises questions concerning the significance of 
the point of first marketing for exhaustion purposes. 
a. Investment Undermined 
The undermining effect on investment is more far-reaching than the 
product sales in the unpatented territories. The effect of parallel 
imports will be to depress prices in protected countries (subject of 
course to governmental price controls). 
If the only way to protect markets where products are patentable is to 
keep products out of countries where they are unpatentable, that is an 
unsatisfactory result for the Community. The ECJ suggests in Merck 
V Stephar that pharmaceutical companies are at liberty to make such 
decisions yet it is all too easy to imagine claims based on Article 85(1) 
Paragraph 112 of the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly 
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or 86 to confront such a marketing strategy". The only apparent 
motive for withholding sales is the protection of monopoly profit and 
it is doubtful whether paragraph 11 of the Centrafarm v Sterling Drug 
judgment^^ (even though approved in Merck v Stephar and in turn in 
Merck v Primecrown) would avail a pharmaceutical company in such 
circumstances. 
Investment in pharmaceutical research and development is therefore 
potentially significantly undermined by the court's decision in Merck 
V Primecrown. It is submitted that this must be a mistake given that 
Europe is a world leader in pharmaceutical development and Britain 
alone is at the forefront of biotechnological advances on which 
pharmaceutical applications are based. The disincentive is a 
considerable one and the industry cost to the developer patentee is 
high. It has been said that, 
"In general...the case remains that parallel trade represents a 
direct transfer of profit from manufacturers to distributors with 
the final payer, whether the government, a sickness fund or the 
patient concerned being rewarded the least. "^' 
It is submitted that this is only half the truth. There is not a Pound for 
Pound transfer between the proprietor and importer. The effect is 
more far-reaching. Even if on individual sales it might be said that 
profit is directly transferred to the parallel importer, in reality, the 
industry base may suffer to a degree that is indeterminate. That in 
turn goes to the root of the patent system and may indeed make the 
See Miller ER International Schallplatten GmbH v the Commission Case 19/77 [1978] E C R 131, [1978] 
2CMLR 334 and discussion in Section 5 below "Significance of Market Conditions" 
Quoted in Section 3b above (n. 53 above) 
REMIT Consultants' report prepared for DGIV entitled "Impediments to Parallel Trade in 
Pharmaceuticals within the European Community" IV/90/06/01, OPOCE 1992 
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difference between a decision on the part of a pharmaceutical company 
to invest in patent development or to leave that particular product 
research. Advocate General Fennelly noted in Merck v Primecrown 
that while markets where rights are not recognised, 
"should not be obliged to contribute to the recovery of research 
expenditure, they should at least not be used to undermine the 
ability to recover R&D costs on other markets."^" 
b. The Right of First Marketing 
What is important to the intellectual property proprietor is the value, 
in the hands of the proprietor, of product exploitation and not that in 
the hands of a subsequent reseller or user. It is the proprietor's 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly profit that attaches to the intellectual 
property and this is found only on sales by the proprietor itself or, i f 
the proprietor opts for first marketing through an intermediary, on 
sales by that intermediary, with the proprietor's consent (for which the 
proprietor is remunerated at a rate that presumably reflects the 
monopoly power of the proprietor to grant that right). This view is 
confirmed by Advocate General Roemer in Deutsche Grammophon v 
Metro''' where he stated that 
"here it should be decisive that the objective of the industrial 
property was attained when the goods were first placed on the 
market, since it was possible to use the monopolistic 
opportunity for gain. On the other hand, it would undoubtedly 
go beyond the objective of that right i f the holder was 
permitted to control further marketing, in particular 
Paragraph 112 of the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly 
Case 78/70 [1971] E C R 487 (n. 28 above) 
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reimportation, and the free movement of goods was 
impeded."" 
Once protected products have been marketed by or with the consent of 
the proprietor, the proprietor might be said to have reaped the benefit 
of the monopoly, i f the monopoly is expressed as the right to achieve 
the commercial return in sales revenue that stems from being the only 
source of that product. I f sales in a particular territory are exposed to 
competition from identical products (which are imported from another 
territory) previously marketed by the proprietor or with the 
proprietor's consent, then the proprietor has already received revenue 
on those product sales. To confer on the proprietor the further right 
of protection against competition from its own products, albeit from an 
indirect source, on which it has already derived sales or licence 
income, would be going further than the level of reward contemplated 
for the proprietor's own development. It would amount to a form of 
double recovery. 
By conferring on the intellectual property proprietor a right of first 
marketing, the proprietor has complete discretion as to how best to 
maximise the potential on direct sales or licence income i.e. income in 
the proprietor's own hands. As the ECJ reaffirmed in Merck v 
Primecrown. intellectual property systems are not there to guarantee 
a reward "in all circumstances". 
However, even if a reward for creative effort carmot be guaranteed in 
all circumstances, it is for the ECJ to determine what the 
circumstances for reward are. It is submitted that, given the impact 
on patent investment, there was sufficient room for the Court to 
uphold the interests of the patentee in the circumstances of Merck v 
Referred to in paragraph 93 of the Judgment of the ECJ in Merck v Primecrown 
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Primecrown in which two countries offer no possibility of realising the 
reward for creative effort and in effect provide circumstances for the 
reward in other countries to be undermined (by reason only of 
transitional non-compliance with the laws that exist elsewhere in the 
Community following harmonisation Directives). It is true to say that 
profit might have been obtainable in the unpatented countries in the 
proprietor's hands but not on the basis of reward in relation to the 
intellectual property or "its specific subject matter". 
5. The Significance of Market Conditions 
In Merck v Primecrown. Article 30 might be regarded as the tool for levelling 
the market for pharmaceuticals at the cost of the patentee when it should be 
the responsibility of the authorities to address national distortions. The ECJ 
stated that 
"although the imposition of price controls is indeed a factor which 
may, in certain conditions, distort competition between Member States, 
that circumstance cannot justify a derogation from the principle of free 
movement of goods. It is well settled that distortions caused by 
different price legislation in a Member State must be remedied by 
measures taken by the Community authorities and not by the adoption 
by another Member State of measures incompatible with the rules of 
free movement of goods."" 
Those "authorities" have failed to provide free market conditions in which 
product movement is driven by free competition in spite of the fact that 
numerous Community harmonisation measures have been taken specifically in 
63 Paragraph 47 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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the pharmaceutical sector. (For example. Council Directives 65/65 and 
93/39*^ "* and Council Regulation 2309/93^^ created a European Agency 
concerned with Community-wide standards of quality, safety and efficacy and 
for product authorisation, Council Directives 92/28*^ and 92/27" were 
directed at marketing standards for the advertising and labelling of products, 
and Directive 87/21 offers an abridged procedure enabling the applicant to 
refer to "essentially similar" results from pre-existing medicinal product 
authorisations of other proprietors to avoid repetition of pharmacological and 
toxicological tests and clinical trials.) Nevertheless, national regulatory 
regimes remain firmly in place for pharmaceutical products to benefit 
governments as powerful purchasers. The result is that the price level of 
imported goods drives down the prices established nationally in the country 
of importation. In Merck v Primecrown. Advocate General Fennelly 
perceived that the effect is, 
"to export not merely the product but also the commercial 
consequences of the legislative choice made by the exporting State to 
the importing State because the patentee has made a commercial choice 
to sell the product even in a less protected environment."*^ 
The economic structure of the market was dismissed by the ECJ in Merck v 
Primecrown and pharmaceutical companies were reminded by the ECJ of their 
decision to choose a marketing strategy to take account of the EC rules of 
Council Directive 93/39/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending Directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC and 
75/319/EEC in respect of medicinal products, (1993) OJ L214/22 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a 
European agency for the evaluation of medicinal products, (1993) OJ L214/1 
Council Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the advertising of medicinal products for human use, 
(1992) OJ L I 13/13 
Council Directive 92/27/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the labelling of medicinal products for human use 
and on package leaflets, (1992) OJ L113/8 
Paragraph 108 of the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly 
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exhaustion. The risks of running directly into claims based on Article 
85(l)and 86 are clear, and have recently been illustrated by the case of 
Merck. Organnon, Glaxo v Commission^^ In that case, a sales system 
applied a 12% discount to wholesalers on sales of products destined for the 
United Kingdom. The discount was structured merely to reflect a scheme 
operated by the United Kingdom government and therefore did not apply to 
sales destined for other countries where no similar scheme exists. Following 
the threat of Commission proceedings, the discount scheme had to be 
abandoned. A similar situation arose in the case concerning the drug 
AdalM™ ("Adalat"). Nevertheless, the Commission fined Bayer AG a total 
of three million ECU for imposing a system of monitoring exports of their 
Adalat drug and limiting supplies to wholesalers to meet domestic demand 
only. The Commission inferred an agreement between Bayer and the 
wholesalers contrary to Article 85(1) on the grounds that the latter understood 
and were influenced by Bayer's "true motives" in imposed the monitoring 
system. That was in spite of the fact, as the Commission recognised, that, 
"differences in price fixing methods and refund arrangements mean 
that there are wide disparities in pharmaceutical product prices in 
Member States." '^ 
The significance of the judgment in Merck v Primecrown. in the light of these 
cases is three-fold. First, it would appear that enterprises are not as free as 
the ECJ might suggest, to adopt a market strategy that takes account of the 
economic market conditions of the pharmaceutical sector. Even if adopted 
unilaterally, the risks of inference of an agreement caught by Article 85(1) are 
high. Secondly, even if a strategy is devised with the intention of protecting 
Order of the Court of First Instance of 3 June 1997 Case T-60/96, [1996] E C R 11-849 
1996 (OJ) L201/1 
Paragraph 55. However, the President of the Court of First Instance suspended the decision because 
there did not appear to be "at first sight" sufficient participation on the part of the wholesalers: Bayer 
V Commission Case T-41/96R [1996] E C R 11-381 
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the proprietor against the effects of exhaustion, this will inevitably involve the 
risk of market partitioning to which the Commission is likely to take 
exception. Thirdly, it is to be expected that such a strategy, if not constituting 
arbitrary discrimination, would constitute a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States. That is indeed the "true motive", albeit to avoid the 
dual effects of exhaustion and governmental fixed price differentials and yet 
is unlikely to be regarded favourably. No measures are currently proposed 
to harmonise government price regulation in the Community and the issue is 
therefore not short-lived. 
C O P Y R I G H T 
The function of copyright has been stated to be "to protect the moral rights in 
the work and ensure a reward for the creative effort"^^ of the author. By 
contrast the specific subject matter of copyright is "the exclusive right to 
reproduce the protected work"". It will be seen that many of the issues 
already discussed in the context of patents are equally relevant to copyright 
although on occasion the ECJ has differentiated between the two in its 
analysis. In Merck v Primecrown. the ECJ differentiated between forms of 
exploitation at least to separate the reproduction right from the rental right. 
This enabled the ECJ to decide in favour of free movement of goods on the 
facts of Merck v Primecrown and to provide an answer to arguments based 
on the earlier case of Warner Bros Inc and Metronome Video ApS v Erik 
Viuff Christiansen '^* ("Warner v Christiansen") on policy grounds. Warner 
were proprietors of the copyright in the James Bond f i lm, "Never Say Never 
Again". Christiansen purchased a video cassette of the film in London and 
took it to Denmark to rent it to the public. Although rental right did not exist 
Paragraph 5 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 10 July 1991, Radio Telefis Eireann v 
Commission. Case T-69/89 [1991] E C R U-485 
iVlagiii/Television Listings E C Commission Decision 89/205 [1989] CMLR 757 
Case 158/86 [1988] E C R 2605; [1990] CMLR 684 
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in the United Kingdom at that time, a rental right separate from the 
reproduction right did exist in Denmark (and had already been granted to 
Metronome). Warner relied on this right to prevent rental of the cassette in 
Denmark. The ECJ held that, 
"where national legislation confers on authors a specific right to hire 
out video cassettes, that right would be rendered worthless i f its owner 
were not in a position to authorise the operations for doing so. It 
cannot therefore be accepted that the marketing by a film maker of a 
video cassette containing one of his works, in a Member State which 
does not provide specific protection for the right to hire it out, should 
have repercussions for the right conferred on that same film maker by 
the legislation of another Member State to restrain, in that State, the 
hiring out of that video cassette."'^  
The point was argued in Merck v Primecrown that patent rights carmot be 
taken to be exhausted by sales in Spain and Portugal where no such rights 
exist. The flaw in this argument was said, by the ECJ, to be found in the 
"specific subject matter" of copyright which distinguishes it from patent 
rights. According to Advocate General Fennelly in Merck v Primecrown 
(which in this respect the ECJ followed): 
"the specific subject matter of a patent right may not be divisible in the 
same way as copyright into several individual acts restricted by 
copyright. But each of the several rights is an item of industrial or 
intellectual property whose existence flows from the law of a Member 
State. 
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In other words, only the right of reproduction was exhausted in Warner v 
Christiansen but not the different and separate performance right (which in 
any event would be dealt with under the free movement of services provisions 
of Articles 59 to 66 of the Treaty). He went on, 
"The essence of the rights (if, admittedly not the extent) conferred in 
two parts on a copyright owner (the exclusive right to reproduce and 
to perform) and in one part in respect of a single act of marketing by 
a patentee are indistinguishable."" 
This raises a number of issues. First, whether it is correct in the treatment 
of patent rights to focus on first marketing of products when a separate 
parallel system of patent protection distinguishes product patents from process 
patents. It has been suggested by Torremans and Stamatoudi that, 
"the specific subject matter of a patent can only be compared to the 
specific subject matter of a copyright in relation to the sale of 
copyrighted products; not in relation to its performance aspect. The 
latter comes closer to the provision of a service rather than the supply 
of material goods."'* 
However, it is submitted that this ignores the fact that a patent process is 
capable of being likened to a service if it does not involve the supply of 
material goods in its exploitation. This should not mean that the specific 
subject matter of patents is confined to product marketing. Take, for 
example, biological media used by water authorities to purify sewage 
according to a microbiological patented process. The media may be used as 
a product, an end in itself, for which it might be appropriate to speak of 
exhaustion only through marketing if the choice is made to sell it. Equally 
Paragraph 133 
Torremans and Stamatoudi (1997) 9 EIPR 545 "Merclc is Back to Stay" 
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however, i f licensed as part of a purification process, it may be more 
appropriate to liken it to a service, as there is no product sale. 
Secondly, to return to the reward aspect of exhaustion, in the case of Warner 
V Christiansen the profit was held to be attributable only to sales and not 
rentals, in view of the separation of the rental and sales markets. The 
presence of different markets with different rules and prevailing prices 
separately applicable to patented products and patented processes should also 
compel the same reasoning to apply to patents, against the judgment in Merck 
V Primecrown. Nevertheless, the ECJ seems ready to make such a 
differentiation in the case of copyright and not patents. In the case of Coditel 
SA V Cine Vog Films SA"^ ^ Cine Voq was granted exclusive film and 
television rights to the film "Le Boucher" in Belgium and Luxembourg which 
excluded television showing for 40 months from film release. A parallel 
licence was granted by the same licensor to a German broadcast company who 
showed it on German television during the 40 month period binding Cine 
Voq. A third party, Coditel, recorded and retransmitted the film shown on 
German television to cable subscribers in Belgium. It was held that television 
transmission was a performing right (a service falling within Article 59 of the 
Treaty), not dependant on physical deliverables, on which revenues are based 
on the number of broadcasts made. The owner therefore had a legitimate 
interest to protect in authorising a television broadcast of the film only after 
it had been exhibited in cinemas for a certain period of time. The right to 
insist on fees for broadcasting the film was said to be part of the "specific 
subject matter" of the right. Strategies demarcated along national boundaries 
with royalties based on usage were therefore held to be necessary to enable 
the proprietor to regulate royalty collection as part of the specific subject 
matter of the performance right. 
79 Case 62/79, [1980] E C R 881 
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This distinction is likely to be perpetuated in future harmonisation measures 
and the appropriateness of this approach must be questioned. The Proposal 
for a Directive entitled "Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society"*" (adopted by the Commission on 10 November 1997) has the aim 
of harmonising rights of distribution and exhaustion within the Community of 
tangible forms of the work of authors such as CDs, tapes and CD-Rom. 
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Proposed Directive is that it excludes 
altogether from its scope delivery of material on line, treating non-tangible 
delivery perhaps artificially as a service or akin to a performance. 
Thirdly, it is noteworthy in the case of Warner v Christiansen that Warner had 
deliberately withheld sales of the video cassette in Denmark. The fact that the 
ECJ found in favour of Warner does perhaps lend some support to the view 
that the intellectual property proprietor does have the power to make 
marketing decisions, which the ECJ will respect, in order to avoid the adverse 
market consequences of the right being exhausted. The free choice of the 
intellectual property proprietor might then be maintained in such a way that 
it may act in its own best interests in making marketing decisions. This is a 
theme consistently threaded through the cases ending in Merck v Primecrown. 
extending back to the case of Musik-Vertrieb Membrau GmbH et K-tel 
International v GEMA-Gesellschaft fur Musikalische Auffuhnungs und 
Mechanische Vervielfaltigungsrechte*' from which came the statement that 
the intellectual property proprietor (in that case an author acting through a 
publisher), 
"is free to choose the place, in any of the Member States, in which to 
put his work into circulation. He may make that choice according to 
his best interests, which involve not only the level of the remuneration 
provided in the Member State in question but also other factors such 
COM (97) 628 Final 
Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, [1981] E C R 147 
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as, for example, the opportunities for distributing his work and 
marketing facilities which are further enhanced by virtue of the free 
movement of goods within the Community."^^ 
In other words, it is apparently open to the proprietor to make the point of 
first marketing the most propitious, but as with all intellectual property, it is 
not open to the proprietor to object to the subsequent free movement across 
other states that follows from exhausting that intellectual property right. The 
critical trigger point remains that of exploitation by the proprietor or with the 
proprietor's consent. Marketing consent in the case of copyright occurs by 
way of licence or assignment (as with other intellectual property) but it is not 
considered to be given in the case of expiry of protection. In EMI Electrola 
GmbH V Patricia Im-und Export and others^\ reliance was successfully 
placed on copyright subsisting in Germany, to prevent reimportation from 
Denmark where the copyright had expired (since the Danish sales were not 
made with the proprietor's consent). Measures have been taken by Directive 
to level distortions base on copyright duration^ and their effectiveness will 
be considered in Chapter Four. It is submitted that those measures are 
piecemeal and, at the same time, the ECJ's case law inconsistent, illustrated 
by the ECJ's treatment of exhaustion of patents and copyright, which does not 
fully acknowledge the convergence of technologies that in reality render the 
form of delivery increasingly irrelevant. 
D. R E G I S T E R E D DESIGNS 
The principles of exhaustion as applied to copyright apply equally to 
registered designs (although the decided cases are fewer in number). This has 
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Paragraph 25 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Case 341/87, [1989] E C R 79 
Council Directive 93/98/EEC 
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been confirmed in Keurkoop BV v Nancy Kean Gifts BV*^. However, those 
cases concerning motor car spares (for example, Consorzio italiano della 
componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli and Maxicar v Regie nationale des 
usines Renault*^), which upheld national law giving a design proprietor 
protection against spare parts importation, must be regarded with some 
suspicion. In the same context, the case of AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) 
Ltd*' is relevant but largely superseded given the sweeping changes to 
European design laws that followed. In that case however, design "specific 
subject matter" was defined as "the right of the proprietor of a protected 
design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, 
without its consent, products incorporating the design."** 
E . T R A D E MARKS 
1. The Subject Matter and Function of Trade Marks 
Principles of exhaustion relating to trade marks are determined by the fact that 
the function of a trade mark is said to be that of identifying the origin of the 
goods i.e. the manufacturer. 
In Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Winthrop BV*^ ("Centrapharm v 
Winthrop") (the trade mark equivalent to the patent case Centrafarm v 
Sterling), the essence of a trade mark (apparently combining both its specific 
subject matter and function) was said to be: 
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Keurkoop BV v Nancy Kean Gifts BV Case 144/81 [1982] E C R 2853 [1983] 2CMLR 47 
Case 53/87 [1988] E C R 6039; [1990] 4 CMLR 265 
Case 238/87 [1988] E C R 6211; [1989] 4 CMLR 122 
Paragraph 2 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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"the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right 
to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting products protected by 
the trade mark into circulation for the first time, and it is therefore 
intended to protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage 
of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products 
illegally bearing that trade mark."'" 
It was held that the proprietor of the Dutch trade mark was not entitled to 
prevent importation of goods bearing that mark which had already been 
marketed by it in the United Kingdom. The ECJ stated that trade mark rights 
could not be relied upon to prevent importation, 
"when the product has been put on the market in a legal manner in the 
Member State from which it has been imported, by the trade mark 
owner himself or with his consent, so that there can be no question of 
abuse of infringement of the trade mark."'' 
This issue of consent, once again, is a critical one but has been restated 
differently in different cases. 
Consent 
In Van Zuvlen Freres v Hag AG'^ ("Hag I" ) , the ECJ ruled on the basis 
(now seen to be wrongly reasoned) that trade mark rights could not be used 
to prevent importation of goods with the same mark, "having the same 
origin". It was then considered by the ECJ that confusion could be avoided 
by measures that would not affect the free movement of goods (presumably 
Issue 2, paragraph 8 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Issue 2, paragraph 8 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Case 192/73 [1974] E C R 731; [1974] 2 CMLR 127 
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labelling and similar devices) and would not otherwise lead to market 
partitioning. 
In SA CNL-SUCAL v Hag AG^^ ("Hag 11") the ECJ took the opportunity of 
restating the principles established in Deutsche Grammophon v Metro. 
Centrafarm v Winthrop. and Pharmon v Hoechst. focusing again on the 
absence of consent on the part of the trade mark proprietor as the determining 
factor (rather than a concept of common origin). Likewise, in the case of IHT 
International Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danzinge v Ideal-Standard GmbH 
and Wabco Standard GmbH^" ("Ideal Standard") concerning the voluntary 
separation of trade mark ownership by means of express trade mark 
assignment, in line with Hag I I . the critical importance of consent was 
emphasised. However, in Ideal Standard the ECJ drew a useful distinction 
between the "essential function of the trade mark" and "the specific subject 
matter of the trade mark". The "essential function" of the trade mark was 
said to be that of identifying origin and protecting the consumer assumption 
that goods bearing the same mark are made by a single source responsible for 
quality control. The "specific subject matter" was said to protect trade mark 
proprietors against competitors' theft of goodwill and reputation. 
Trade Mark Legislation 
The above cases were decided before trade mark law had become harmonised 
in the Community. Formal measures are increasingly taken to enshrine 
principles of exhaustion in the legislation of Member States. This can have 
a significant impact on the interpretation of principles of exhaustion beyond 
the immediate context of trade marks. Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 
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Case C-10/89 [1990] E C R 1-371 
Case C-9/93; [1994] E C R 1-2789 
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December 1988 to approximate the laws of Member States relating to trade 
marks'^ ("the Trade Mark Directive") contains the following requirements: 
" 1 . The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its 
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in 
the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with 
his consent. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons 
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of the 
goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed 
or impaired after they have been put on the market."'* 
The Trade Mark Directive was implemented substantially in this form into the 
United Kingdom law by means of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. 
Section 12 states: 
"(1) A registered trade mark is not infringed by the use of the trade 
mark in relation to goods which have been put on the market 
in the European Economic Area under that trade mark by the 
proprietor or with his consent. 
(2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply where there exist legitimate 
reasons for the proprietor to oppose further dealings in the 
goods (in particular, where the condition of the goods has been 
changed or impaired after they have been put on the market)." 
The similarity between the Trade Mark Directive and the Act is striking. 
(1989) OJ L40/1 
Article 7 
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Owing to different labelling requirements and pharmaceutical practices in 
Member States, trade mark protection might be used by a trade mark 
proprietor to prevent a change of condition necessary to allow products to be 
sold from one country into another. The ECJ has therefore been keen to 
ensure that trade marks are not used as a device for doing so and has 
developed clear principles concerning repackaging and trade mark substitution. 
Change of Condition 
a. Repackaging 
At the heart of the repackaging cases has been the extent to which 
Article 36 may entitle a trade mark proprietor to rely on principles of 
trade mark infringement to prevent importation of goods which have 
been repackaged but nevertheless bear the proprietor's trade mark. 
In Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzengnisse mbH^' ("Hoffman-La Roche"). 
Centrafarm acquired "Valium" marketed in the United Kingdom by 
Hoffmann-La Roche and repackaged it using the same Hoffmann-La 
Roche trade mark (owned by Hoffmarm-La Roche in the United 
Kingdom and Germany) for sales in Germany. The ECJ emphasised 
the trade mark function (following Centrafarm v Winthrop) to be that 
of guaranteeing for the consumer (or ultimate user) the identity of the 
origin of the product so that the consumer, 
"can be certain that a trade marked product which is sold to 
him has not been subject at a previous stage of marketing to 
interference by a third person, without the authorisation of the 
proprietor of the trade mark, such as to affect the original 
Case 102/77 [1978] E C R 1139 
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condition of the product. The right attributed to the proprietor 
of preventing any use of the trade mark which is likely to 
impair the guarantee of origin so understood is therefore part 
of the specific subject matter of the trade mark right."'* 
Accordingly, the ECJ decided that the first sentence of Article 36" 
would entitle a trade mark proprietor to prevent unauthorised 
importation of repackaged goods. However, the ECJ stated that any 
ban on imports could constitute a disguised restriction on trade caught 
by the proviso to Article 36'°° and the ECJ listed the criteria which 
would prevent reliance on trade mark rights by the proprietor. The 
proprietor's use of the mark would be caught by the proviso, if the 
proprietor were to adopt a registration policy or marketing strategy 
which contributes to the artificial partitioning of the markets between 
Member States, if the original condition of the product is not adversely 
affected by repackaging, and if the fact of repackaging is disclosed on 
the package itself and to the trade mark proprietor. In these 
circumstances, the trade mark proprietor could not object to 
reimportation based on trade mark rights. 
The significance of the proprietor's own marketing strategy is 
obviously critical in determining whether it imposes a "disguised 
restriction". The ECJ in Merck v Primecrown emphasised the 
proprietor's supposed free choice of marketing strategy available in the 
light of the extent of intellectual property protection available. The 
ECJ in Merck v Primecrown did not give sympathetic attention to the 
allegation that was suggested could be levelled against the proprietor. 
Issue 2, paragraph 7 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
"The provisions of Article 30 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods 
in transit...justified on the grounds of...the protection of industrial or commercial property" 
"Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or 
a disguised restriction of trade between Member States" 
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that the strategy artificially partitions the market, where the strategy 
is driven by the inadequacy of protection in certain Member States. 
The matter, once again, is to be resolved by reference to the subject 
matter and function of the intellectual property right in question. 
The criteria laid down in Hoffmann-La Roche were applied in the case 
of Pfizer Inc v Eurim-Pharm GmbH'°^ The importer, Eurim-
Pharm, placed substitute external wrapping on the product 
"Vibramycin", which had already been marketed by Pfizer in the 
United Kingdom in blister strips, in such a way as to indicate both the 
manufacturer and the fact of rewrapping. Pfizer was unable to rely on 
its trade mark in Germany (where the prevailing price was 
considerably higher) to prevent importation because in these 
circumstances, "no use of the trade mark in a manner liable to impair 
the guarantee of origin takes place". 
The issue of "artificial partitioning" came under scrutiny in the more 
recent line of repackaging cases, Bristol-Myer Squibb v Paranova A/S 
and CH Boehringer Sohn. Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Boehringer 
Ingelheim A/S v Paranova A/S and Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and Bayer 
Danmark A/S v Paranova A/S'°^ ("Paranova") . The crucial parts 
of the judgment summarise the essential function of the trade mark, 
"which is to guarantee to the consumer or end-user the identity 
of the trade-marked product's origin by enabling him to 
distinguish it without any risk of confusion from products of 
different origin. That guarantee of origin means that the 
consumer or end-user can be certain that a trade marked 
product offered to him has not been the subject at a previous 
Case 1/81 [1981] E C R 2913; [1982] 1 CMLR 406 
Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93, [1996] ECR 1-3457 
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stage of marketing to interference by a third person, without 
the authorisation of the trade mark owner, in such a way as to 
affect the original condition of the product."'"^ 
The trade mark owner may therefore prevent any use which interferes 
with the guarantee of origin. 
The ECJ related the issue of "artificial" market partitioning to the 
essential trade mark function by saying that partitioning is not artificial 
if it is done in order to preserve the guarantee of origin. 
"By stating that the partitioning of the market must be 
artificial, the court's intention was to stress that the owner of 
a trade mark may always rely on his rights as owner to oppose 
the marketing of repackaged products when such action is 
justified by the need to safeguard the essential function of the 
trade mark, in which case the resultant partitioning could not 
be regarded as artificial."'** 
The test of artificial partitioning is to be applied objectively, judged at 
the time before enforcement (presumably at the stage of formulation 
of a strategy for trade mark registration). The ECJ also concluded that 
the condition of a product would not be adversely affected (applying 
Hoffmann-La Rochel by the application of self-adhesive labels to 
flasks, phials, ampoules or the translation of written instructions for 
use in different Member States'"^ The ECJ also took the 
opportunity of addressing the position of the parallel importer. 
Paragraph 47 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Paragraph 57 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
In any event, it has been established in PaM v Dahlhausen (Case C-238/89 [1990] 1 ECR 4827) that 
national laws concerning packaging requirements will contravene Article 30 if they prevent the 
marketing of products because they are not packed or marked in a particular way 
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extending the Hoffmann-La Roche requirements of identification of the 
manufacturer to cover also a requirement that the new packaging must 
state the identity of the repackager and the manufacturer (to whom 
specimens must be made available upon request) in a form of print and 
language intelligible to a normally attentive person with normal 
eyesight, identifying additional items for which the trade mark owner 
is not the source. Also, the presentation of the packaging must not 
damage the reputation of the trade mark or its proprietor'"^. Finally, 
the extent to which a parallel importer may repackage is obviously 
important, as the judgment only permits repackaging "insofar as the 
repackaging undertaken by the importer is necessary to market the 
product in a Member State of importation."'"' 
Relabelling 
The case of Frits Loendersloot v George Ballatine and Sons LTD'"* 
("Loendersloot v Ballantine") appears recently to have confirmed the 
ECJ's willingness to permit relabelling, in that case of whisky bottles 
with the removal of the identification number of the bottle, the name 
of the importer and the word "pure", provided the relabelling does not 
defeat another legitimate purpose of the original label such as the 
identification of the manufacturer and chain of supply for product 
liability purposes and provided the relabelling causes "as little 
prejudice as possible to the specific subject matter of the trade mark 
right. "'"^ 
106 
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Paragraphs 67-78 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Paragraph 56 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Case C-349/95, [1997] E C R I 6227 
Paragraph 46 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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c. Trade Mark Substitution 
Different rules appear to apply in the case of trade mark substitution 
rather than repackaging. Substitution may be relevant where the mark 
originally applied is confusing, is not lawful in the territory of 
importation, is not passed by the drug approval authorities, or is 
unfamiliar to pharmacies and doctors prescribing them. 
In Centrafarm v American Home Products Corporation CAHPy'". 
quantities of the sedative "Oxazepamum", which had been sold by the 
proprietor of that mark, AHP, in the United Kingdom under the mark 
"Serenid D" were purchased by a parallel importer and resold under 
the mark "Serestra" in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, AHP 
marketed the product under its mark "Seresta" with the same 
pharmacological properties but with a different taste. AHP 
successfully claimed infringement of the trade mark "Seresta" since 
this had been applied in the Netherlands without the consent of the 
proprietor. The ECJ confirmed that only the trade mark proprietor is 
entitled to give its products their identity by fixing the trade mark, and 
the guarantee of origin principle would be offended by anyone else 
doing so. The Court acknowledged that the deliberate use of two 
different marks to achieve artificial partitioning would amount to "a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States" under Article 
36 but that valid (not "artificial") justifications for the use of different 
trade marks in Member States might exist. Examples would be the 
existence of trade marks in a country of proposed sale, differences in 
the pharmaceutical packaging laws of Member States, or other 
plausible, explicable, cultural, envirormiental, political, social or legal 
variations. 
n o Case 3/78 [1978] E C R 1823; [1979] 1 CMLR 326 
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It is significant that rules of confusion for the purpose of trade mark 
law differ considerably from country to country. In Hag I I . Advocate 
General Jacobs"^ noted the abundance of confusingly similar marks 
and the likelihood that intracommunity trade would be significantly 
impeded. He noted that confusion judged by the German standard in 
Societe Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v Societe Terranova Industrie CA 
Kapferer & Co"^ would not amount to confusion in the United 
Kingdom. Therefore a German exporter could sell in the United 
Kingdom but a United Kingdom exporter could not sell in Germany. 
Rules of confusion still appear to be a matter to be determined at 
national level, as confirmed more recently in Deutsche Renault AG v 
Audi A G " l 
"Community law does not lay down any criterion requiring a 
strict interpretation of the risk of confusion.'""' 
d. Advertising 
In order to permit the practical implementation of the developed 
principles of exhaustion, it has now been clearly established that the 
parallel importer may undertake ancillary activities such as advertising. 
In Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV"^ 
("Christian Dior v Evora") the ECJ affirmed the practice of advertising 
Christian Dior products by a company which held less of a "luxury 
image" than Christian Dior, provided that it did not "seriously 
Paragraph 591 of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs 
Case 119/75 [1976] E C R 1039; [1976] 2 CMLR 
Case C-317/91, [1993] 1 E C R 627 
Paragraph 31 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
Case C-337/95 [1997] E C R I 6013 
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damage" the reputation of the trade marks used or the goods. A 
luxury brand would not however be treated as "seriously damaged" 
merely by sales at a cheaper price than those chosen by the trade mark 
proprietor for a given territory. 
T E R R I T O R I A L E X T E N T OF T H E DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION 
The implementation of the Trade Mark Directive has been the recent catalyst 
for important and long-awaited clarification of whether, at least in the trade 
mark context, rights are exhausted when first marketed outside the 
Community. Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive is ambiguous insofar as 
it relates to the position of goods which have been first put on the market 
outside the Community. Article 7 may be interpreted as merely setting a 
minimum standard, requiring Member States to apply principles of exhaustion 
throughout the Community but leaving them free to decide whether to apply 
principles of international exhaustion beyond that. (Those favouring this 
interpretation maintain that Article 7 is merely a modification of existing ECJ 
case law, since the Court itself has stressed that Article 7 is to be interpreted 
in the same way as the Court's case law on Articles 30 and 36. It is 
maintained that the aim of the Trade Mark Directive was limited and, in the 
absence of clear wording to the contrary, the discretion that countries 
previously had to apply international exhaustion, should remain.) 
Alternatively, Article 7 may be interpreted as a maximum standard, requiring 
Member States to apply principles of exhaustion only within the Community 
and not internationally beyond the Community. (Those arguing in favour of 
a maximum point to the third recital of the Directive's preamble, which refers 
to the approximation of national provisions of law which most directly affect 
the functioning of the internal market and maintain that international 
exhaustion is one such principle which the Trade Mark Directive aimed to 
harmonise.) 
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This ambiguity potentially gives rise to considerable difficulties in assessing 
the value of trade marks and the scope of protection afforded by them. The 
consequences for due diligence examination are not immediately apparent but 
are far-reaching, as suggested by Carboni"''. She considered there to be no 
general doctrine of exhaustion beyond the confines of the EEA. She 
interpreted the Trade Mark Directive by referring to the travauxpreparatoires 
which preceded the Directive"'' and concluded that these materials 
demonstrate that one purpose of these measures was to prevent discrimination 
of businesses within the Community where no reciprocal free movement 
measures apply in countries outside the Community. 
"There is a real danger that undertakings whose principal place of 
business could well be in a non-Member country would prevent their 
products being imported into the Community at more favourable 
prices, which would be detrimental to Community consumers.""* 
Her conclusion was that it is open to countries to extend exhaustion laws to 
permit imports from countries outside the EEA where the national law of the 
non-EEA exporting country permits reimports from the EEA. If reciprocal 
treatment to parallel imports was found between non-EEA and EEA countries 
then a defence may be available to the EEA importer of goods of non-EEA 
origin. However, as Carboni observed, this would "entail reliance on the 
expert evidence of a local lawyer from the country of origin of the parallel 
imports in order to establish the existence of reciprocity". This would add 
time and considerable expense to any due diligence investigation. It would 
require a factual investigation of all sales made in non-EEA countries and an 
Anna Carboni "Cases Past the Post on Trade Mark Exhaustion: An English Perspective" (1997) 4 EIPR 
198 
The First Protocol (presented to the Council on 25 November 1980), Proposal for a Regulation (COM 
(80) 635), Explanatory Memoranda. 
Commentary on Article 11 of the Proposal for the Regulation on the Community Trade Mark COM (80) 
635, Explanatory Memorandum 
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investigation, for each type of intellectual property right, of the laws of each 
country of the EEA and the availability of remedies, bearing in mind that the 
availability of remedies throughout the Community is an important area that 
is as yet unharmonised. Matters would be complicated by the fact that 
reliance cannot be placed on interpretation of Directive requirements by other 
EEA states ("Wagamama v Citv Centre Restaurants"^). 
Clarification of such fundamental ambiguity would greatly assist the due 
diligence process. The different interpretations historically given by different 
Member States bears out the complexity of due diligence without such 
clarification. The Trade Mark Directive has been interpreted by the Federal 
Supreme Court of Germany to mean that exhaustion in the EEA does not 
occur as a result of first sales outside the EEA (Levi Strauss v Knecht'^"). 
According to that decision, legislation enacted in 1995 in Germany pursuant 
to the Trade Marks Directive may be relied upon to prevent importation into 
Germany of jeans first marketed in the USA. That legislation represented a 
clear reversal of the principles of international exhaustion which had been 
developed in Germany prior to its enactment. Before the Trade Marks Act 
1994, the United Kingdom took an inconsistent approach to exhaustion in the 
United Kingdom by non-EEA sales. It appears that the Court of Appeal in 
Colgate Palmolive v Markwell Finance'^ ^ permitted reliance on United 
Kingdom trade mark rights to prevent imports of an inferior quality toothpaste 
where that amounted to misrepresentation of quality and consent could not be 
implied. However, consent to worldwide sales was found to be present in 
Revlon v Cripps & Lee"^ in the marketing strategy of the trade mark 
proprietor under the well known slogan, "New York, Paris, London". 
[1995] FSR 713 
GGH, Urt V. 14. 12. 1995 - IZR 210/93 
1989 RFC 497 
[1982] FSR 85 
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The historical disparities in national trade mark law are therefore crucial to an 
understanding of the importance of the Silhouette Case" .^ Advocate 
General Jacobs recognised that in view of these disparities, it was necessary 
for the Trade Mark Directive to transform the impact of Community law on 
trade mark protection'^''. He appealed to the aims and scope of the 
Directive having determined that the terms of the Directive themselves are not 
conclusive. In spite of the fact that there are obvious limits to the scope of 
the Trade Mark Directive, as it was not intended as a measure of total 
harmonisation, it nevertheless did set out to harmonise the essential conditions 
and consequences of trade mark protection and he recognised that the scope 
of the exhaustion principle is central to the content of trade mark rights. 
Turning to the effect of national disparities concerning international 
exhaustion. Advocate General Jacobs concluded that: 
"The Directive regulates the substance of trade mark rights, and its 
provisions are designed to be substituted for the diverse national laws 
across the whole range of its provisions."'^^ "If some Member 
States practise international exhaustion while others do not, there will 
be barriers to trade within the internal market which it is precisely the 
object of the Directive to remove. "'^ ^ 
Accordingly, he agreed with the submission of various countries (which 
argued against any discretion to apply international exhaustion) that the same 
products could be the subject of parallel imports into one Member State but 
not into another and that this was clearly against the aims of the internal 
market. 
Case C-355/96 [1998] Judgment of the Court Transcript, 16 July 1998 (n. 38 above) 
Paragraph 39 
Ibid 
Paragraph 41 
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In his opinion, Advocate General Jacobs refers also to the text and intention 
of the Community Trade Mark Regulation^" ("Community Trade Mark 
Regulation"). The Community trade mark is perhaps the most developed of 
the Community's harmonisation measures because of its unique emphasis on 
"unitary character". 
"A Community Trade Mark shall have a unitary character. It shall 
have equal effect throughout the Community, it shall not be registered, 
transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a decision revoking the 
rights of the proprietor or declaring it invalid, nor shall its use be 
prohibited save in respect of the whole Community. 11128 
Article 13 of the Community Trade Mark Regulation is a mirror image of 
Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive, providing for exhaustion only for 
goods which have been put on the market "in the Community". Advocate 
General Jacobs concluded that it is impossible to construe the Regulation as 
imposing international exhaustion, similarly with the Trade Mark Directive. 
The original Proposal for the Directive expressly provided for international 
exhaustion and was subsequently changed to limit it only to the Community. 
The Trade Mark Regulation, given its unitary character, caimot be intended 
to give Member States discretion whether or not to permit international 
exhaustion. In view of the history of the Directive, its purpose and the 
identical wording to the Regulation, Advocate General Jacobs concluded that 
Article 7(1) of the Trade Marks Directive is to be interpreted to entitle a trade 
mark owner to prevent a third party using the mark when importing goods 
into an EEA country after first marketing in a country outside the EEA. 
127 
128 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark OJ (1994) L 
11/1 
Article 1(2) 
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The ECJ followed the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs by concluding as 
follows: 
"[T]he Directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it open to the 
Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the 
rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the 
market in non-member countries ... This ... is the only interpretation 
which is fully capable of ensuring that the purpose of the Directive is 
achieved, namely to safeguard the functioning of the internal market. 
A situation in which some Member States could provide for 
international exhaustion while others provided for Community 
exhaustion only would inevitably give rise to barriers to the free 
movement of goods and the freedom to provide services."'^' 
That level of clarification, although given in the context of trade marks, is of 
great value insofar as the reasoning applies equally to other intellectual 
property rights. As national disparities in the treatment of international 
exhaustion of any intellectual property right will inevitably result in barriers 
to trade within the internal market, the reasoning of the ECJ can be applied 
to other intellectual property rights. However, there have been no 
harmonisation measures apart from the Trade Mark Directive aimed at 
wholesale substitution for diverse national laws and doubtless there will be 
many more cases in the future arising out of the disparities in those laws. 
G. DUE D I L I G E N C E ISSUES 
The consequences of the developing doctrine of exhaustion are manifold when 
acting for the purchaser of a business, be that of a parallel importer or 
intellectual property proprietor. Due diligence investigation requires a 
detailed examination extending far beyond verification of the title and 
129 Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Judgment of the ECJ 
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ownership of intellectual property, including the detailed dealings of the rights 
in the business and related activities of that business. In addition, the effect 
of the rules of exhaustion on the value of intellectual property (in the hands 
of the proprietor) is extremely difficult to ascertain. 
When acting for the owner of a business dependent on its ownership of 
intellectual property, a great many highly complex issues will need to be 
investigated. For example, in relation to patents, whether a policy of first 
marketing in the EEA has been adopted to maximise profits by excluding 
marketing or consent to sales in countries where the prevailing product price 
is low, whether by reason of lack of patent protection, price control or some 
other factor. An assessment of the particular policy adopted by a business 
would be unfeasible in the time typically available for completion of a 
business or company sale as it would require analysis of price and market 
conditions and the position of the proprietor's (and competitors') intellectual 
property in each country. 
It might be assumed that it would be easy to determine whether consent has 
been given to marketing. However, consent to first marketing may have been 
given inadvertently. For example, a practice of licensing may fail to meet the 
requirements of any applicable block exemption Regulation"", and be caught 
by Article 85(1) of the Treaty either because the express contractual 
provisions fail to meet the block exemption terms or the pre-conditions for 
exemption are not satisfied. It is arguable that the relevant restrictions 
(including territorial scope) are void and therefore consent has been given 
without territorial limit. Apart from the risk of fines and that the licensor 
may be unable to recover royalties, this may also place the licensor in breach 
of other licence agreements which are intended to be exclusive. Even then the 
likely effect of any consensual marketing in countries intended to be reserved 
to the licensor (or other licensees) will need to be examined. Inadvertent 
Discussed below in Chapter Three 
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consent may also be given by the adoption of an "international" brand (Revlon 
V Cripps & Lee). 
Assessment of copyright and design right works is made far harder given the 
wide disparities that exist across the national laws of Member States and lack 
of substantive harmonisation beyond the provision for minimum levels of 
protection provided by international corporation as discussed further in 
Chapter Four. 
If acting for the proprietor of a trade mark, any practical barriers to re-
importation must be legitimate. For example, any product identification must 
be for tracing purposes relating to such matters as safety or product liability 
and not as a deterrent against re-importation (Adalat. Loendersloot v 
Ballatine). The use of expensive packaging may be an effective deterrent 
against repackaging particularly if cheaper packaging would cause "serious 
damage" to the trade mark or goods (Christian Dior v Evora). There must be 
no artificial territorial division achieved by the use of different trade marks 
(Paranova). something that can only be judged by the presence of features that 
adequately explain any actual market division. Al l of these items are a matter 
of degree and do not lend themselves to due diligence assessment, yet it is 
essential to ensure that profit for the intellectual property proprietor is 
maximised. 
In relation to all intellectual property rights (whether acting for the intellectual 
property proprietor or parallel importer) the complexity of these issues is 
further aggravated by the accession of new countries to the EU, especially the 
transitional periods of derogation applicable to those which are less 
economically developed. These are typically the territories in which low 
prices are most likely to prevail and provide lucrative parallel export markets 
but where protection may not exist equivalent to the rest of the EEA. There 
may also be products available in those markets prior to accession to which 
special rules apply. For trade marks, in spite of the Community Trade Mark 
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Regulation, the unitary character of the trade mark cannot be reconciled with 
prior trade marks held in acceding countries. Article 52 of the Community 
Trade Mark Regulation provides for invalidity of the Community Trade Mark 
in respect of earlier trade marks. A Community Trade Mark may conflict 
with a national mark held in an acceding country by a different owner. Either 
the owner of the trade mark in the acceding country, or the owner of the 
Community Trade Mark, if not both, will suffer by any resolution of the issue 
since both marks cannot co-exist within the Community following accession 
so as to confer rights on the proprietor in relation to acts of infringement. A 
close eye needs to be maintained on such issues, involving searches in all 
countries likely to accede in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, it is one 
area in which Community Trade Mark measures may be seriously hampered. 
I f both marks are allowed to co-exist the unitary character of the Community 
Trade Mark is lost. 
In addition, the distinctions between EC and EEA territorial coverage will 
continue to give rise to anomalies especially given the potential for differing 
rules concerning international exhaustion (Polydor Limited and RSO Records 
Inc. V Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited"'). 
Finally, commercial arrangements between the parties in the Community or 
EEA and acceding countries will be of considerable importance as well as 
other arrangements with effects in any acceding country, if they were 
conceived on the assumption that the territory remained outside the 
Community or EEA (as appropriate). 
In short, harmonisation of intellectual property by these particular Treaty 
provisions has been effected at considerable cost to the intellectual property 
proprietor and has added greatly to the task of due diligence investigation. 
131 Case 270/80 [1982] E C R 329 
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CHAPTER T H R E E : 
HARMONISATION BY REGULATION 
(COMPETITION LAW REGULATIONS) 
"Tender-handed stroke a nettle, and it stings you for your pains, grasp it like a 
man of mettle, and it soft as silk remains"^^^ 
Aaron Hill (1685-1750 "Verses Written on a Window") 
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HARMONISATION BY REGULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will begin with the point at which Articles 30 and 36 (covered 
in the previous Chapter) meet Articles 85(1) and 86. It will examine the 
difficulties posed by Articles 85(1) and 86 in any due diligence investigation 
of intellectual property in licensing and joint venture transactions in the light 
of recent EC harmonisation measures adopted by way of Commission 
("Regulation"). The importance of competition law to intellectual property 
due diligence is that the effect of Article 85(1) can be to undermine critically 
the commercial value of the rights held by a proprietor, licensee or joint 
venturer, operating as it does to render certain clauses in intellectual property 
transactions, or even entire agreements, void. 
Articles 30 and 36 together define the extent to which intellectual property 
rights may be used by an intellectual property proprietor to rely on territorial 
barriers based on national protection. Articles 30 and 36 address the 
consequences to the intellectual property proprietor of first marketing 
products. However, Articles 30 and 36 only deal with marketing by the 
proprietor or by a licensee (ie. with the proprietor's consent). 
Articles 85(1) and 85(3) together define in general terms the extent to which 
the intellectual property proprietor and licensee may enter into agreements 
conferring or reserving territorial exclusivity or which are otherwise 
potentially restrictive of competition. An agreement prohibited by Article 
85(1) is automatically void and unenforceable under Article 85(2) unless 
exempt under Article 85(3); however, only those particular provisions which 
are prohibited by Article 85(1) will be void i f they are severable from the 
remainder of the document (Societe Technique Miniere (LTM) v 
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Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (MBU)"-'). An infringement of Article 85(1) or 
86 exposes undertakings to the risk of fines of up to 10% of the combined 
gross worldwide annual turnover of the groups to which they belong'^. 
Even if extensive indemnities are given by the vendor of a business to cover 
the costs of any fine, the purchaser will nevertheless risk being involved in 
lengthy proceedings and will suffer the uncertainty of not knowing the 
outcome of any Commission investigation or challenge to the enforceability 
of any intellectual property agreement acquired. 
The Commission is empowered to grant exemption from the prohibition of 
Article 85(1) under Regulation 17 Article 9(1) following formal notification 
by the parties concerned, or (by virtue of Council Regulation 19/65"^) by 
way of block exemption regulations in respect of categories of bilateral 
exclusive agreements and licences of intellectual property, the aim being to 
enable the Commission to reduce its case-load of individual notifications. 
In exercising its power under Council Regulation 19/65, the Commission has 
adopted the following Regulations in recognition that it is generally supportive 
of vertical licensing agreements that enable small companies to penetrate new 
markets or promote innovation: Regulation 2349/84 relating to patent 
licensing agreements"^ (the "Patent Regulation"), Regulation 417/85 
relating to specialisation agreements"^ (the "Specialisation Regulation"), 
133 
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Case 56/65 [1966] E C R 337; [1966] CMLR 357 
Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 OJ (1962), 13/204 OJ 1959-62, 87 
Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of 2 March of the Council on application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of 
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices (1965) OJ No. 36/533 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty of certain categories of patent licensing agreements OJ (1984) OJ L219/153 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements (1985) OJ L53/1 
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Regulation 418/85 relating to research and development agreements^ ^^  (the 
"R&D Regulation"), Regulation 556/89 relating to know-how agreements'^ ' 
(the "Know-How Regulation"), and most recently. Regulation 240/96 relating 
to technology transfer agreements"*" (the "Technology Transfer 
Regulation"). The Technology Transfer Regulation repealed the Know-How 
Regulation with effect from 1 April 1996 but continued the Patent Regulation 
until 31 March 1996. Article 85(1) was disapplied in relation to agreements 
in force on 31 March 1996 which fulfilled the exemption requirements of 
either the Know-How Regulation or the Patent Regulation. In effect, the 
Technology Transfer Regulation replaces those earlier Regulations for the 
purposes of agreements entered into after 1 April 1996'^ ". The Patent 
Regulation and Know-How Regulation are therefore still relevant for due 
diligence of agreements that predate the effective date of the Technology 
Transfer Regulation. 
Of these, the Technology Transfer Regulation and the R&D Regulation 
(leaving aside the Patent Regulation and Know-How Regulation for present 
purposes) are concerned with territorial exclusivity in licence agreements and 
as such provide the interface between Articles 30 and 36, on the one hand, 
and Articles 85(1) and 85(3), on the other. These two Regulations focus 
(inter alia) on the extent of permissible territorial exclusivity, balancing the 
requirements of Articles 85(1) and 85(3). 
The Technology Transfer Regulation was aimed at simplifying the existing 
block exemptions and, as a harmonising measure, accommodating 
technological advances. 
Commission Regulation E E C 418/85 (1985) OJ L53/5 (n. 2 above)* 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of know-how licensing agreements (1989) OJ L61/1 
(1996) OJ L31/2 (n. 1 above) 
Article 11 of the Technology Transfer Regulation 
-70-
142 
143 
144 
145 
"The rules governing patent licensing agreements and agreements for 
the licensing of know-how ought to be harmonised and simplified as 
far as possible, in order to encourage the dissemination of technical 
knowledge in the Community and to promote the manufacture of 
technically more sophisticated products"'''^. 
The Commission acknowledged'"-' that the grant of exclusivity is seen as a 
necessary incentive for the intellectual property proprietor to grant licences 
and for the licensee to invest in manufacture and marketing in the allocated 
territory'"". However, it is emphasised in the Technology Transfer 
Regulation that the principles of Articles 30 and 36 are not to be affected: 
"The exemption of export bans on the licensor and on the licensee does 
not prejudice any developments in the case law of the Court of Justice 
in relation to such agreements, notably with respect to Articles 30 to 
36 and Article 85(1). This is also the case, in particular, regarding the 
prohibition on the licensee from selling the licensed product in 
territories granted to other licensees (passive competition) "'"^ 
It is submitted that the measures taken by the Commission to regulate the 
terms of intellectual property agreements, have failed in their aim of providing 
certainty to parties due to the Commission's innate tendency to be 
conservative in any group or "block" exemption. This is best illustrated by 
its approach in the Technology Transfer Regulation. It is necessary to 
examine that Regulation in some detail before its effect and shortcomings can 
be appreciated. 
Recital (3) Regulation 240/96 
Recital (10) Regulation 240/96 
Recital (12) Regulation 240/96 
Recital (11) Regulation 240/96 
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B. T E C H N O L O G Y TRANSFER REGULATION 
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It is noteworthy that the Technology Transfer Regulation emerged in 
anticipation of the pending expiry of the Patent Regulation which was to occur 
on 31 December 1994"*. The Commission draft which was first circulated 
in April 1994 met with vehement criticism and was rejected as unworkable 
largely due to the incorporation of market share criteria as conditions for 
exemption (originally territorial exclusivity would only be available to a party 
if it has a market share of less than 40%). The Regulation was so delayed 
that it did not in fact come into force until 1 April 1996. The market share 
test is still present in Article 7(1) in diluted form when compared with the 
original proposals, in such a way that exemption conferred by the Regulation 
is withdrawn i f the effect of the agreement is to prevent the licensed products 
being exposed to effective competition in the exclusive territory from the same 
or similar products "which may in particular occur where the licensee's 
market share exceeds 40%""^ 
Scope of the Regulation 
The Technology Transfer Regulation applies"^ to licences of patents on their 
own ("pure" patent licences), licences of non-patented technical information 
("such as descriptions of manufacturing processes, recipes, formulae, designs 
or drawings""'), ("know-how licences") and combinations of both, ("mixed 
Extended to 30 June 1995 by Commission Regulation 70/95. The Know-iiow Regulation was due to 
expire on 31 December 1999 
Market share assessment is nevertheless still relevant for the purposes of Regulations 417/85, 418/85 
and (for the purposes of "old agreements") Regulations 2349/84, 556/89 — see also Regulation 151/93 
in the context of joint ventures 
Article 1.1 
Recital (4) 
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licences"). The licences may cover other ancillary intellectual property'^", 
in particular, trade marks, design right and copyright, especially software'^' 
but it is only appropriate to include this ancillary intellectual property when 
the additional licensing contributes to the achievement of the objects of the 
patent or know-how technology and the provisions relating to these items are 
only ancillary (ie. the provisions relating to these additional items only contain 
restrictive obligations which attach equally to the licensed patents or know-
how'"). Ancillary intellectual property is therefore narrowly defined, 
emphasising the limits of the Regulation to catch primarily only patent and 
know-how rights but not other intellectual property. 
The significant step taken by the Commission in creating a combined 
Regulation for patent and know-how licences does recognise that in reality the 
two rights are essentially similar in nature and in practice are licensed 
together. The combination is creditable also in the transitional treatment to 
repealing the earlier Know-how Regulation and Patent Regulation because any 
licence that would have been exempt under either of those two Regulations 
would also be exempt under the more relaxed regime of the new Regulation. 
Another positive result of the Technology Transfer Regulation is that it did 
away with the artificial analysis that had to be made in the past to determine 
in the case of a licence which included know-how whether the know-how was 
ancillary to patents, and covered by the Patent Regulation, or was more than 
ancillary and therefore eligible for exemption only under the Know-how 
Regulation. The two are now combined in a more flexible form but still 
differentiating between core patents and know-how for the purpose of 
determining the scope of permissible territorial restrictions'^^. 
Article 1.1 
Recital (6) 
Article 10(15) 
See Article 1 and Recitals 3 to 9 and 12 
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Pure Patent Licences 
Article 1.2 deals with the duration of territorial restrictions in pure patent 
licences. The licensor may be prevented from granting equivalent patent 
licences to others in the allocated territory'^ "* and may be prevented from 
exploiting the patent itself'^^ for the duration of the patents (ie. for so long 
as they are maintained)'^*. Similarly, for the duration of the patents, the 
licensee may be prevented from exploiting by any means the licensed patent 
in the licensor's territory'" and may be prevented from exploiting the patent 
by manufacture or use'^ ^ or by active sales and marketing'^' in territories 
licensed to other licensees of the licensor. 
In addition, the licensee may be prevented even from making passive sales 
against unsolicited orders'*" in territories licensed to other licensees but only 
during the period of five years from the date when the licensed product is first 
marketed within the Common Market by one of the licensees'*' and then 
only to the extent that there is protection in those territories by parallel 
patents. Notice that first marketing is by one of the licensees and not the 
licensor itself, so that sales by the licensor do not extinguish that right. 
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Pure Know-How Licences 
The position of pure know-how licences is dealt with in Article 1.3, 
permitting the same restrictions on the licensor and licensee except that the 
maximum duration of those restrictions differs. It is confined to a period not 
exceeding ten years from the date when the licensed product is first put on the 
market within the Common Market by one of the licensees except that this 
period ends five years from that date in the case of the restriction on the 
licensee putting licensed product on the market in territories licensed to other 
licensees in response to passive orders. It may not be within the knowledge 
of the licensor or any licensee precisely when first marketing occurred, as this 
may be known only by another licensee who has not communicated this to the 
licensor. Nevertheless, the date of first marketing is the critical trigger event 
for the permissible period of these restrictions. Each licence agreement 
should therefore require the licensee to communicate the date of first 
marketing though this is rarely ever done. The parties to know-how licences 
are therefore at risk that they are giving effect to restrictions beyond their 
permissible end-date and are conducting themselves under the agreement 
contrary to Article 85(1) even if the form of their agreement is compliant with 
the Technology Transfer Regulation. 
An important proviso'^^ to exemption is that it only applies if the parties 
clearly identify all licensed know-how and subsequent improvements and it 
only applies for so long as the know-how remains secret and substantial. This 
is consistent with the definition of know-how in Article 10 as "a body of 
technical information that is secret, substantial and identified in appropriate 
form". The terms "secret", "substantial" and "identified" in turn are defined 
in such a way as to result in a requirement that the know-how must be secret 
in the sense that it confers a market lead (even if all component parts are 
publicly available) and it must be "useful" in conferring competitive edge, and 
Article 1.3 
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verifiable (so that it is distinguishable from the licensee's own technology 
which is to be kept free of restrictions). There is no doubt that this 
requirement of the Technology Transfer Regulation will assist the due 
diligence process, assuming that the parties have accurately identified the 
know-how, since this will be documented. However, if the parties have 
documented the know-how, but inaccurately or incompletely, they may be 
operating the limited restrictions that are only permissible in relation to 
qualifying documented know-how, in relation to undocumented know-how. 
Although the undocumented know-how may be capable of qualifying for 
exemption, it does not if it is not identified. Once again, even though the 
document on its face may comply with the Regulation, the unidentified know-
how that is licensed de facto would not be licensed within the exemption and 
the conduct of the parties may therefore still infringe Article 85(1). This 
would not be verifiable on due diligence investigation. 
Mixed Licences 
The duration permitted for the same restrictions in mixed licences reflects a 
combination of the rules separately applicable to patents and know-how 
licences. The permissible period is the same ten year period as for know-how 
or, if longer, the duration of "necessary patents" in Member States where they 
are held'*^ Article 10(5) defines "necessary patents" rather inelegantly as, 
"patents where a licence under the patent is necessary for the putting 
into effect of the licensed technology in so far as, in the absence of 
such a licence, the realisation of the licensed technology would not be 
possible or would only be possible to a lesser extent or in more costly 
or difficult conditions. Such patents must therefore be of technical, 
legal or economic interest to the licensee". 
163 Article 1.4 
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This test of whether a patent is a "necessary patent" depends on the capability 
of each licensee and may vary from one licensee to another. The same 
technology in the hands of one licensee may result in a ten year period of 
protection while, in the hands of another, the period of protection will be the 
patent term. Even in cases of a single licensee, an assessment of whether a 
patent is a "necessary patent" cannot be made by examining the 
documentation alone although an indication is likely to be given on 
questioning of the licensee. 
The concept of "necessary patents" is one newly introduced by the Technology 
Transfer Regulation and is found nowhere else in any Regulation or Directive. 
It also unintentionally has the potential of putting urmecessary constraints on 
both licensor and licensee in relation to improvements. 
6. Improvements 
I f technical progress is indeed to be made (as contemplated by the Technology 
Transfer Regulation) the licensor should be encouraged to disclose and license 
improvements in order to keep the technology at its cutting edge and most 
competitive. I f the improvements are patented and yet are not sufficiently 
"core" to a product to constitute "necessary patents", the licensor runs the risk 
that the permissible restrictions may only be applied for a period of ten 
years'^ *. The licensee on the other hand itself may wish to be clear that the 
restrictions only apply for ten years by claiming that the improvements patents 
are not "necessary patents". In doing so, the licensee risks termination of the 
agreement i f it contains a white-listed clause envisaged by Article 2.1(16), 
reserving to the licensor the right to terminate the licence agreement of a 
patent if the licensee raises the claim that such a patent is not necessary. 
(Note that this is consistent with the white-listing of "no-challenge" clauses 
in Article 2.1 (15) entitling the licensor to terminate a licence if the licensee 
164 Though when the ten year period commences may be uncertain 
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contests the secret or substantial nature of the know-how or challenges the 
validity of licensed patents even though these clauses were black-listed in the 
Know-how Regulation and Patent Regulation.) 
It is also worth bearing in mind in the same context that improvements clauses 
that extend the licence life are no longer black-listed'*^ unless a territorial 
restriction on either the licensor or licensee is extended'**. Article 2.1(4) 
directly addresses improvements in the white list by confirming as non-
restrictive 
"an obligation on the licensee to grant to the licensor a licence in 
respect of his own improvements to or his new applications of the 
licensed technology", 
with two important provisos. The first is that where the improvements are 
severable, the licence must be non-exclusive so that the licensee is free to 
exploit them elsewhere freely (insofar as the licensor proprietary information 
is not thereby disclosed). I f improvements are not severable, the licence may 
presumably be taken back on an exclusive basis although Article 2.1(4) does 
not expressly say so. In any event the question of severability is one of fact 
and would require care in examination. The second proviso is that any grant-
back of improvements must be reciprocal ie. the licensor must undertake to 
grant an exclusive or non-exclusive licence of improvements to the licensee. 
No explanation for the second proviso is given in the Recitals and it is 
considered that the requirement in Article 2.1(4) on the licensor to grant the 
corresponding licence of improvements is unusual. It is potentially restrictive 
of competition since it prevents the most propitious application of the 
technology by the licensor and this may not necessarily be justified by a 
licence of improvements made by the licensee. If the Commission was aiming 
These were previously black-listed under Article 3.2 Patent Regulation and Article 3.10 of the Know-
how Regulation 
Article 3(7) 
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at fairness it is odd that it should do so at the cost of free competition. 
(Article 3(6) confirms that an obligation on the licensee to assign its 
improvements to the licensor is black-listed.) 
Quantity Limits 
Article 1.1(8) expressly exempts an obligation on the licensee to 
"limit production of the licensed product to the quantities that the 
licensee requires in manufacturing its own products and to sell the 
licensed product only as an integral part of or a replacement part for 
his own products", 
provided that such quantities are freely determined by the licensee. White-
listed in Article 2.1(12) is a clause with similar effect which permits an 
obligation on the licensee not to use the licensor's technology to construct 
facilities for third parties. 
The purpose of this is explained in Recital 8, the objective being to facilitate 
the dissemination of technology and improvement of manufacturing processes 
in this instance where the licensee itself manufactures the licensed products or 
sub-contracts manufacture. It therefore excludes agreements solely for the 
purpose of sale. The Commission clearly exempts a restriction intended to 
confine the licence scope only to the licensee's own requirements, whatever 
those might be. However, quantity restrictions in the case of sales agreements 
are not countenanced, and even measures to monitor "own" or "domestic" 
requirements, as in Adalat'". may be treated as Article 85(1) infractions. 
There seems little justification to differentiate an agreement granted by a 
patent proprietor to a patent licensee (for manufacture and sale) from an 
agreement granted by a patent proprietor, who undertakes its own 
Case T-41/96R [1996] E C R 11-381 (n. 70 above) 
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manufacture, to a distributor (for sales only) where both are used as a means 
of marketing patented products. I f it is permissible in the Technology 
Transfer Regulation to limit production quantities in an exclusive patent or 
know-how licence to the licensee's own requirements, the same should be 
permitted in an agreement between the patentee and a reseller. 
The White List and the Black List 
The white list and black list are critical in all Regulations (the black list 
particularly so because the inclusion of a single black-listed clause would 
preclude automatic exemption) but they do not deserve special mention 
because these provisions, on the whole, are self-evident and when found in 
any licence agreement during due diligence their scope may be matched, word 
for word, or in substance, to determine the status of the clause. If any clauses 
exist which are not expressly exempt under Article 1, which are not white-
listed under Article 2, or black-listed under Article 3, they may be presumed 
to be eligible for exemption within the Regulation i f the Commission confirms 
this under the more stream-lined opposition procedure established under 
Article 4. The requirements for formal notification using Form A/B will 
usually be waived at the Commission's discretion if the text of the agreement 
is submitted together with an analysis of market structure and an estimate of 
the licensee's market share requiring considerably less information than Form 
A/B. Exemption may be claimed'** unless the Commission opposes it 
within four months, two months shorter than the six month period under the 
Patent Regulation and Know-how Regulation. At present, the opposition 
procedure is in limited use by parties to such agreements with under a dozen 
or so submissions in each year. The Commission's lack of enthusiasm is 
likewise found in the fact that the opposition procedure was omitted altogether 
from the early drafts of the Regulation. 
168 Article 4 
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9. Matters Not Apparent on Due Diligence 
Even i f the form of an agreement meets all the requirements of Article 1, 
contains any number of white-listed clauses in Article 2 and no black-listed 
clauses in Article 3, and even if grey-listed clauses (ie. neither white-listed nor 
black-listed) are passed under the expedited opposition procedure, exemption 
may still be jeopardised and the parties exposed to the full consequences of 
infringement of Article 85(1) for reasons that are not apparent and caimot be 
examined by due diligence investigation at least on document inspection alone. 
The adverse effect on the value of the intellectual property would be 
considerable. 
For example, under Article 3, exemption is refused where there exists a 
concerted practice (or unjustified requirement) between the parties resulting 
in refusal by one party to meet demand from users or resellers in its allocated 
territory who would market the products in other territories within the 
Common Market"'^ or where the parties make it difficult for users or 
resellers to obtain the products from other resellers within the Common 
Market, in particular by the exercise of intellectual property rights or other 
measures which 
"prevent users or resellers from obtaining outside, or from putting on 
the market in the licensed territory products which have been lawfully 
put on the market within the Common Market by the licensor or with 
his consent"'™. 
The resonance of this wording with the case law on Articles 30 and 36 is 
obvious and it may be taken as placing limits on the freedom of the licensor 
of patents or know-how (or both) freely to establish a licensing strategy. In 
169 
170 
Article 3(3)(a) 
Article 3(3)(b) 
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particular, it may prevent a patentee, if the facts of Merck v Primecrown'^' 
were repeated, from choosing a licensing strategy that avoids sales of products 
in territories unprotected by patents if they are protected elsewhere. Such a 
strategy in one or more patent licences might be seen as a measure making it 
difficult for users or resellers, for example in Spain or Portugal ("within the 
Common Market") to obtain the product from other resellers by the exercise 
of intellectual property rights. Article 3(3) reflects the Commission's 
eagerness to ensure that products are freely available to resellers "within the 
Common Market" and it remains to be seen whether such a strategy would 
benefit from exemption under the Technology Transfer Regulation if 
implemented through an exclusive patent licence. Reliance no doubt will be 
placed by licensors on the expression "without any objectively justified 
reason" in Article 3(3). 
It is worth noting also that Article 2.1(14) contains an important white-listed 
provision which permits 
"a reservation by the licensor of the right to exercise the rights 
conferred by a patent to oppose the exploitation of the technology by 
the licensee outside the licensed territory". 
This might be taken to be a reference to the principles of exhaustion, intended 
to clarify that direct sales by a licensee outside its allocated territory are not 
to be taken as exhausting the proprietor's rights in the country of importation. 
The consequences for due diligence are as follows. First, it cannot be known 
in the absence of further clarification of the decision in Merck v Primecrown 
or the Technology Transfer Regulation itself whether a licensing strategy 
which avoids marketing in a territory unprotected by patents will disapply the 
exemption that might otherwise be available. The Technology Transfer 
Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95 [1996] E C R 1-6285 (n. 51 above) 
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Regulation has reminded us that it does not apply to pure sales agreements but 
it clearly contemplates clauses concerned with the marketing activities of the 
licensee and the extent to which they may be excluded from the "territory of 
the licensor."'^^ Assuming that the Article 1.1 restrictions are permitted 
within the time-limits in Articles 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 and no further, the 
marketing freedom of the licensor is extremely limited. Article 1.2 states in 
the case of a pure patent licence, that exemption is granted only to the extent 
that and for so long as the licensed product is protected by parallel patents of 
the licensor, licensee and other licensees. If a territory is not protected by a 
parallel patent, for example, because the patent law of that country did not 
permit it at the time that the equivalent patent was granted in other countries, 
Article 1.2 may be construed to disentitle the proprietor from relying on any 
territorial restriction contemplated in Article 1.1. (One aspect of the 
Technology Transfer Regulation that is particularly welcomed is that the 
commencement date for the time limits is now the date of first marketing, 
rather than, under the Patent Regulation and the Know-how Regulation, the 
date of the agreement. I f the change had not been made, the life of those 
restrictions might well have expired before first marketing of pharmaceutical 
products.) In short, many of the uncertainties of Merck v Primecrown apply 
equally to the Technology Transfer Regulation. 
Secondly, as has been noted. Article 3(3) disapplies automatic exemption if 
there exists a concerted practice or requirement between the parties with the 
effects described in Article 3(3). This is a matter which is not likely to be 
apparent on the face of any document. Similarly, Article 3(4) disapplies 
exemption if the parties to the agreement, which is otherwise perfectly 
compliant with the Technology Transfer Regulation, were competing 
manufacturers at the time of the agreement, if the agreement contains 
customer or user limitations and similar. At least the clue to further 
investigation of that particular issue would be the presence of the clause 
Article 1.1(3) to (6) 
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imposing the limitation. However, the same cannot be said of the 
preconditions for exemption in Article 5 or the circumstances for withdrawal 
of exemption under Article 7. 
Article 5 disapplies exemption to the following: agreements between members 
of patent or know-how pools (even though pooling may not be evident), 
licences involving a joint venture where the parents are competitors'^^ 
(except where the parties' combined market share for the relevant product is 
less than 20% for production licences and 10% for production and 
distribution"''), and reciprocal arrangements between competitors under 
which the licence is granted in exchange for an intellectual property or 
marketing licence — this exclusion recognises that the wider arrangement may 
not be apparent as it continues, "albeit in separate agreements or through 
connected undertakings."'^^ 
Under Article 7, exemption is withdrawn in the most general of 
circumstances, namely where the effect of the agreement is to prevent the 
licensed products being exposed to effective competition in the licensed 
territory from identical or similar goods. This is said, in Article 7(1), to 
occur where the licensee's market share exceeds 40%. It is submitted that, 
as with all market share criteria, this approach is extremely unhelpful and 
adds great uncertainty to the status of agreements expressly drafted to benefit 
from exemption. The Commission included market share criteria both in 
Article 5.2 and 7(1) in spite of the fact that it was the aspect of market share 
that raised so much protest against early drafts of the Technology Transfer 
Regulation and delayed its progress. Further, under Article 7(2), matters 
solely within the conduct of the licensee may result in loss of the exemption. 
Exemption is lost if the licensee refuses, without objectively justified reason, 
Because this is covered by Regulation 151/93 
Article 5.2(1) 
Article 5.1(3) 
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to meet unsolicited orders from users or resellers in the territory of other 
licensees. This is beyond the power of the licensor to prevent and it cannot 
be verified on document inspection alone. The matter may even not be within 
the knowledge of the licensor and so oral enquiry may not reveal it. 
Nevertheless, as a party to the agreement which does not thereby benefit from 
exemption, the licensor is exposed to the consequences of unenforceability, 
fines and so on. 
Article 7(3), similar to Article 3(3), disapplies exemption if the parties, 
without apparent justification and without it being a requirement present in the 
agreement refuse to meet demand in the territory where the product is for 
resale outside the territory into other Common Market countries or where the 
parties otherwise make it difficult for users or resellers to acquire the products 
from other Common Market sources (whether by means of intellectual 
property rights or otherwise). 
Article 7(4) concerns an unquantifiable effect which deprives an otherwise 
exempt agreement of sanctuary if the parties are competitors at the date of the 
licence and the best endeavours or minimum quantity marketing obligation on 
the licensee has the effect of preventing the licensee from using competing 
technologies. This is not a matter that can be tested by due diligence or even 
at the stage of entering into the agreement and yet the status of the agreement, 
particularly i f reliance is placed on territorial restrictions, is critical. Added 
to this, the liability of the warrantor giving broad intellectual property 
warranties will be considerable. The commercial cost of loss of territorial 
restrictions is illustrated by Merck v Primecrown and the cost of warranty 
liability will be commensurate with that loss. 
Finally, when an agreement is challenged and a decision is to be made 
whether its terms comply with those of a block exemption, the agreement 
-85-
must comply in each and every respect if it is to be enforceable by a national 
court (Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Brau AG'''*). 
10. Conclusion 
The single most important criticism of the Regulation is its uncertainty. 
Criticism initially focused on the use of market share criteria in the body of 
the white-list and black-list of clauses. Market share calculations are most 
uncertain when new technologies emerge yet it is precisely these technologies 
that will contribute most to technical and economic progress. The market in 
which fledgling science is first licensed is often extremely narrow and 
specialised and a reference to market share alone to determine market power 
is inappropriate where no sales of a given technology have taken place. The 
Commission itself is aware, for example, of the sensitivities of defining 
markets in which pharmaceutical products belong because they do not face 
direct competition and might be said to possess 100% market share before a 
single penny of research money is recouped by sales. Nevertheless, the 
uncertainty of market share remains in various places in the Technology 
Transfer Regulation, albeit not in the core Articles 1 to 4. However, the 
preconditions for exemption and circumstances of withdrawal in Articles 5 and 
7 are equally, i f not more, uncertain in the context of due diligence since they 
concern matters that are incapable of verification except by an extremely 
expensive and time-consuming enquiry and even then the result would 
continue to be unresolved. 
The difficulties of making a market share assessment are so great that the 
Commission itself has considered it necessary to publish a Notice on the 
definition of relevant markets for the purposes of Community competition 
law'"'"' focusing principally on demand substitutability (ie. the ability of 
Case C-234/89 [1991] 4 C M L R 329 E C R 1-935 
(1997) OJ 372/5 [1997] 7 E C L R 473 
-86-
176 
177 
178 
customers to switch from one product to another in response to price rises) as 
the main determinant of market share over supply substitutability and potential 
competition. The need for economic tools demonstrates the complexity of the 
science of market share determination. 
Another shortcoming of the Technology Transfer Regulation is that it is 
limited in scope, confined as it is to patents, know-how and ancillary rights. 
The Commission has in certain circumstances adopted Regulations which deal 
with all categories of intellectual property, namely the Specialisation 
Regulation and R&D Regulation but these likewise are limited in ambit and 
do not cover licensing agreements typically found in industry. It is perhaps 
because the Technology Transfer Regulation in its draft state met with such 
opposition that the Commission was reluctant to be too ambitious in its 
reforms or harmonisation measures even if the result is unsatisfactory both for 
lawyers and industry. 
For example, there is no block exemption dealing with trade marks or 
copyright even though exclusive trade mark licences may be caught by Article 
8 5 ( 1 ) , as demons t r a t ed by Moosehead /Whi tb read ' ^^ 
("Moosehead/Whitbread"). In order to determine whether particular clauses 
in licences of trade marks or copyright infringe Article 85(1), a detailed 
review must be made of the case law concerning that particular right. In 
Moosehead/Whitbread. the Commission's reasoning provides extremely useful 
guidance but of course offers no exemption, leaving the parties with no choice 
when entering into exclusive arrangements potentially caught by Article 85(1), 
than to go to the trouble, expense and uncertainty of notifying them. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe the comparison with the US intellectual 
property guidelines adopted by the US antitrust enforcement agencies. 
9 0 / 1 8 6 / E E C Commission Decision of 23 March 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
E E C Treaty (1990) OJ LlOO/32; [1991] 4 C M L R 391 
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"The EC Block Exemption and the USIP Guidelines reflect their very 
different jurisprudential ancestry. In the EC, the strict construction of 
the complementary roles of Article 85(1) and Article 85(3), coupled 
with a virtual anathema for provisions which restrict free movement 
of trade between Member States has resulted in much less balancing 
of such purpose and effect factors than in the United States. In 
contrast, the USIP Guidelines place great emphasis on the factual 
context in which the licensing operates, that is, its purpose and 
effect."'™ 
In fairness to the Technology Transfer Regulation and the regime of Article 
85 as a whole, the emphasis of EC measures is and always has been on the 
market effect of particular agreements and practices. In that sense it is far 
more coherent that the formalistic approach of the United Kingdom Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1976 ("the RTPA") which will not catch agreements 
which cause competition mischief if drafted in a way that avoids the use of 
Section 6 or Section 11 restrictions. The new form RTP(C) used by the 
Office of Fair Trading requires relevant information and analysis but not to 
the extent of the burdensome Form A/B. Due diligence for RTPA compliance 
may be easier than Article 85(1) compliance by document examination alone. 
However, Article 85 is more commercially realistic as it is rooted deeply in 
market effects but that does nothing to assist an evaluation for compliance for 
so long as Article 85(1) is so broad and far-reaching, and the block 
exemptions so narrow, and remain conditioned on matters that defy 
verification. 
179 Howard W Togt and Ilene Knable Gotts. "A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Takes Different Approach From US Counterpart Guidelines" (1996) 6 E C L R 327 
-88-
COPYRIGHT L I C E N C E S 
It is clear'^° that the Commission considers that the principles of patent and 
know-how licensing apply equally to copyright licensing, even if copyright 
licences that meet the rigours of the Regulation are, strictly speaking, not 
themselves exempt. However, certain types of licence will be outside Article 
85(1) and no exemption will be necessary. Even exclusive licences may be 
outside Article 85(1) i f they are "open", and exclusivity is indispensible to the 
launch of newly developed products on which considerable research and 
development expenditure has been invested, for reasons of market penetration 
as illustrated by LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the 
European Communities^^^ ("Nungesser"). 
A licence is "open" where the licensor agrees not to grant further licences and 
agrees not to compete with the licensee in its exclusive territory, provided that 
no protection is given against competition by other licensees or parallel 
importers. The ECJ established that such an open licence would avoid Article 
85(1) i f the product licensed is new and unfamiliar, it requires market 
penetration by exclusivity to recoup significant research costs, and the licence 
is not for excessive duration. These matters are impossible to determine with 
any certainty and must be treated with care (as illustrated by Knoll-Hille 
Form'^2 in which product investment was not considered sufficient to justify 
exclusivity, although the Commission may have been influenced by the fact 
that both parties held sizable market shares). 
Market share may also be an issue under Article 86 if the licensor is 
dominant, as demonstrated by IBM's tying practices which were condemned 
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by the Commission'*^; similarly, where barriers to entry exist and a 
copyright owner withholds valuable data which would open a market in 
compatible products or TV programme listings (Magill TV Guide'^). 
However, the ECJ in Magill indicated that it would only treat a refusal to 
license intellectual property as an abuse of dominant position in exceptional 
circumstances. 
As far as software licensing is concerned, the Commission decided to deal 
with harmonisation by means of the Software Directive'*^ but did not take 
the opportunity of providing any further clarification or indeed block 
exemption for agreements relating to copyright in spite of the burgeoning 
industries in the software, multimedia and entertainment sectors. 
D. TRADE MARK L I C E N C E S 
As with copyright, the Commission has confirmed that guidance may be found 
in the Technology Transfer Regulation to exemptible terms and there is every 
reason to suppose that the principles of permissible "open licences" established 
in Nungesser will equally apply to trade mark licences. However, 
Moosehead/Whitbread serves to highlight that in reality the uncertainty 
continues as, in that case, the Commission decided that the exclusivity of the 
licence was caught by Article 85(1) because it has the consequence of 
excluding third parties from being granted the licence where they have the 
interest and ability to do so. This is surely the case with all exclusive licences 
even if they are "open". 
No block exemption exists for trade mark licences and so parties who do not 
notify exclusive trade mark licences are at risk. Guidance on particular 
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Commission Decision of 31 January 1995 relating to a proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of the E C 
Treaty (1995) OJ L221/34 
Council Directive 91/250 E E C (n. 3 above) 
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clauses has been given in the case of Campari^ ^ .^ Exemption was granted 
to restrictions guaranteeing quality control, an obligation to purchase essential 
secret raw materials from the licensor (herbs and colouring), obligations of 
confidentiality, a ban on sub-licensing or assignment, an export ban outside 
the EC (but only where reimportation was unlikely), and obligations on the 
licensee actively to promote the product. The Commission also emphasised 
that exemption needed to be sought for non-competition undertakings by the 
licensor'". 
In Moosehead/Whitbread. the Commission exempted an obligation to comply 
with the licensor's manufacturing instructions to preserve quality, an 
obligation to obtain raw materials with specific properties (yeast) only from 
the licensor, obligations of confidentiality and requirements for joint 
advertising (provided independent advertising is not excluded). However, in 
that case, the Commission refused to exempt a no-challenge clause although 
the Commission appears to be relaxing its position on no-challenge clauses 
over the years, as reflected in the Technology Transfer Regulation. 
In short, the position of trade mark licences is as uncertain as that of 
copyright licences. Any guidance offered by the Technology Transfer 
Regulation is only as good as that Regulation itself, which as has been noted, 
is open to a great deal of criticism. 
E . JOINT VENTURES 
In spite of the fact that Article 130 of the Treaty'^* requires the Community 
to promote "research and technological development activities of a high 
quality", the steps taken by the Commission so far have been limited. These 
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78/253/EEC Commission Decision of 23 December 1977 relating to proceedings under Article 85 of 
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are confined to Notices which are of guidance only and one significant 
Regulation, the R&D Regulation which, as with the Technology Transfer 
Regulation, is subject to preconditions and market share stipulations which 
render a document review or other due diligence investigation at best of 
limited value. 
The Commission's activity began with the Commission's Notice on 
Cooperation Between Enterprises'*^ but as the Commission's reasoning 
developed, it draw a distinction between concentrative joint ventures, which 
are the result of a permanent merger of a business, and cooperative joint 
ventures (of present concern) which are not generally economically 
autonomous and are the result of coordination between the joint venture 
parents over a limited duration"". As cooperative joint ventures can take 
any form, they do not readily lend themselves to automatic exemption and so 
the Commission has issued more general guidance in the form of the Notice 
on Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures'^'. The Commission 
distinguishes between the competition effects of the creation of the joint 
venture, which result from its mere existence, and the effects of ancillary 
contractual arrangements that surround it and which might be restrictive of 
competition. I f the creation of the joint venture itself is outside Article 85(1), 
so also are the ancillary restrictions if they are a necessary means of achieving 
the joint venture aims"^. The emphasis in determining whether restrictions 
are necessary and ancillary (and therefore permitted) is on restrictions that 
limit the freedom of action in the market of the participating undertakings'". 
The Commission has repeated a preference for separate research and 
(1968) OJ C 75/3 
Regulation 4064/89 (1989) OJ L395/1 and Merger Control Regulation and Commission Notice on 
Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures (1993) OJ C 43/2 
(1993) OJ C43/2 
Paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Notice on Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures 
Paragraph 65 of the Notice on Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures 
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development activities by independent entities, since this is bound to result in 
greater consumer choice (assuming separate products emerge), and is 
concerned also to ensure that parties are not prevented by joint research and 
development from getting a competitive advantage over each other. The 
Commission will also favour a research and development joint venture 
between non-competitors where independent product development by either of 
them is unlikely ('ODIN)"^ 
The extent to which research and development joint ventures may go further 
than the research and development stage to cover licensing of the research and 
development results to the parents has been the subject of the R&D Regulation 
(as amended by Commission Regulation 151/93) which grew out of 
developments in Commission reasoning over many years as reflected in a 
number of cases (such as Brown/Boveri and NGK'^\ Carbon Gas 
Technologies"^ Beecham/Parke Davis'^^. and EMI/Jungheinrich'^^. 
These cases and principles illustrate the complexity and uncertainty of the 
status of research and development agreements even if the Commission is 
generally supportive of them. In order to clarify these principles in the case 
of certain commonly found research and development agreements the 
Commission published the R&D Regulation as a means of conferring 
automatic exemption. 
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PARTICULAR R&D AGREEMENTS 
The R&D Regulation applies to agreements for the joint research and 
development of products or processes with or without joint exploitation of the 
results. It therefore differs from the 1968 Notice in that it deals with applied 
research and development agreements (ie. dealing also with the exploitation 
of results) rather than pure research agreements. The scope of exploitation 
originally permitted in the R&D Regulation was broadened by Regulation 
151/93'^' and is seen as a useful extension to what would otherwise have 
been a Regulation of such narrow application that it would have been of little 
practical value. Another useful aspect of the R&D Regulation is that Recital 
14 expressly permits exploitation within the scope of other block exemptions 
with the result that (within the limits stated in the body of the R&D 
Regulation) these may in effect be bolted on to span both the research and 
development phase and subsequent exploitation phases with third parties, 
whether by way of patent licence or exclusive distribution. 
Article 1 makes general reference to "research and development" and is 
intended to catch any form of joint venture contract without being specific as 
to its precise content. 
The preconditions of exemption in Article 2 require the research and 
development work to be carried out according to a clearly defined programme, 
setting out its objectives and field^°°. Al l the parties must have access to the 
results^"'. I f it is a pure research and development agreement all parties 
must be unrestricted in their exploitation of the results (except to the extent 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 151/93 of 23 December 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 
417/85, (EEC) No. 418/85, (EEC) No. 2349/84 and (EEC) No. 556/89 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of specialisation agreements, research and development 
agreements, patent licensing agreements and know-how licensing agreements 
Article 2(a) 
Article 2(b) 
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exempt under Articles 4 and 5f°^. Joint exploitation (and any exempt 
restrictions) must relate only to "results" which are protected by intellectual 
property rights or constitute know-how which substantially contribute to 
technical or economic progress such that the results are decisive for the 
manufacture of the contract products or the application of a contract 
process^ *^ .^ Background technology will be included in this if "decisive for 
their manufacture". Assuming a document reflects these preconditions and is 
carefully drafted so they are not capable of being avoided (ie. the restrictions 
are suitably tailored and conditional) there still remains the continuing risk (as 
with all block exemption Regulations) that the parties put the arrangement into 
effect in such a way that the agreement as practised falls outside the scope of 
the R&D Regulation. For example, if the parties in practice bundle together 
as "results", within the meaning of Article 2(d), other intellectual property to 
which the parties are not entitled to apply the exempt restrictions, then the 
entire arrangement is jeopardised. This would be almost impossible to verify 
in due diligence. 
Article 3 deals with the duration of exemption for agreements, depending on 
whether the parties are competing manufacturers. This itself is a matter of 
judgment and difficult to verify and could well change rapidly over time. It 
might even be precipitated by a change of control resulting from acquisition 
for which the due diligence investigation is conducted. 
I f the parties are competing manufacturers of products that will be improved 
or replaced by the contract products then exemption will be for the duration 
of the research and development programme and, if the results are jointly 
exploited, five years following first product marketing within the Common 
Market. I f the parties are competing manufacturers, exemption is only 
allowed for the above duration (by virtue of Article 3.2) if at the time of 
Article 2(c) 
Article 2(d) 
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entering into the agreement the parties' combined market share is less than 
20% in the Common Market or a substantial part (for products that are 
improved or replaced by the contract products). The difficulties of market 
share assessment have already been highlighted. Following expiry of that 
period, the exemption wi l l , under Article 3.3, continue but only for so long 
as the parties' market share does not exceed 20%, this time where the market 
is differently defined (but in the more conventional way) to be the total market 
for products considered by users to be equivalent. This entails a separate 
market analysis from the one required under Article 3.2. 
The R&D Regulation underwent amendment in 1992^°* such that if product 
distribution is entrusted to one of the parties, a joint undertaking or a third 
party, exemption may still apply (for five years) but only i f the parties' 
production of those products is less than 10% of the market for all such 
products in the Common Market or a substantial part^°^. The exemption 
will continue the beyond the initial five year period in such circumstances 
provided the parties' combined market share (m the conventional sense) does 
not exceed 11% in any two consecutive financial years. If it does, then 
exemption will end within six months of that occurrence. This suggests that 
market shares are readily ascertainable with certainty to a level of precision 
that distinguishes 10% from 11%. In reality, not only is it extremely difficult 
for a party to establish its own market share but the task is more than doubled 
by the need to make an assessment of the market share of the other party. 
The relevant information is likely to be highly confidential, guarded against 
public access, and enquiry is only likely to mislead (because answers will tend 
to suggest a lower market share than actually exists). The R&D Regulation, 
for its insistence that these matters are ascertainable is unreasonable. 
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A rehearsal of the content of the detail in the core Articles 5, 4 and 6 would 
bear out further the limitations of the R&D Regulation but would not warrant 
the space in a work of this length. 
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Mention of Articles 85(1) and 85(3) would be incomplete without reference 
to the notification procedure and its shortcomings. Form A/B requires such 
detailed information that its preparation typically occupies weeks of 
management time and of course considerable legal expense, all of which is 
disproportionate in the case of undeveloped or newly-launched technology, 
particularly when owned by start-up companies. The Commission's Notice on 
Agreements of Minor Importance^"'' provides a reason in such circumstances 
for not notifying an agreement but the uncertainties of market share definition 
and calculation are such that an agreement may easily be challenged, as being 
above the 5% or 10% market share de minimis levels respectively applicable 
to horizontal and vertical agreements, i f it concerns technology that is 
sufficiently innovative to be in a market of its own (or at least not directly 
substitutable with other products). Similarly, there remains the risk that a 
change of control of one of the parties to the agreement will place the market 
shares above those thresholds. Due diligence is frequently carried out in 
anticipation of a change of control or other transaction that will require a 
reassessment of the turnover figure. 
Notification using Form A/B is only as good as the information given in 
support of it. A considerable amount of judgment and discretion is applied 
when compiling supporting market information and the parties necessarily play 
down the potential ill-effects of the agreement notified. This does carry the 
risk of subsequent challenge by the Commission, by a party to the agreement 
or a third party. When advising the purchaser of a business to which a 
Commission Notice 97/C 372/04 (1997) OJ C372/13 
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notified agreement is crucial, it is impossible to verify the completeness or 
accuracy of the notification detail without performing a repeat market analysis. 
Yet if the notified document was wrong when submitted, the notification is 
flawed and the agreement itself is fundamentally open to challenge. 
The more informal comfort letter procedure however is available to the 
parties, following notification, instead of pursuing the notification procedure 
to a formal conclusion. The advantage of a comfort letter, which is merely 
a statement of the Commission's view on the matter before it, is that it may 
protect the parties from a fine or other penalties but it has the shortcoming 
that it is not binding on any national court, nor even the parties. I f a party 
relying on the agreement wishes to enforce it in a national court, proceedings 
are stayed until the matter is formally dealt with by the Commission by way 
of individual exemption based on the information given at the time of seeking 
the comfort letter. However it is too easy for a party challenging the validity 
of the agreement to claim that the information previously given is out of date 
and that the Commission is not entitled to grant individual exemption^°^. 
Even if the circumstances have not changed and individual exemption may be 
granted, the delay will be considerable and may be tactically fatal to the 
litigation. Comfort letters need to be reviewed with scepticism with these 
additional points in mind. 
H. A R T I C L E 86 
Quite apart from considerations of Article 85(1), an exclusive licence may fall 
foul of Article 86 if granted to a licensee which is dominant. Even if granted 
to a licensee which is not dominant at the date of the agreement, if the licence 
207 Automec Sri v Commission of the European Communities Case T-64/89 [1990] E C R 11-367 [1992] 5 
CMLR 431 
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is subsequently acquired by a company that is dominant, or which owns 
alternative technology, this may result in infringement of Article 86^*. 
I . SUMMARY 
The consequences of infringement of Article 85(1), in terms of the economic 
value of intellectual property and far-reaching and therefore due diligence 
investigation to reveal the extent and effect of any such infringement is 
critical. The difficulties posed for any purchaser of a business involved in 
agreements concerning intellectual property rights are considerable. Guidance 
has been given by the Commission and Regulations issued in order to offer 
automatic exemption and in order to provide clarity on the status of such 
agreements. The aim of the block exemption Regulations, of reducing the 
Commission's caseload, is unlikely to be achieved as successfully as it might 
for so long as the Commission is so conservative in its approach to such 
Regulations and places such emphasis on market share calculations. The end 
result is that the guidance (such as it is) is so specific, and exemption offered 
by Regulation is so narrow, that it really offers little comfort to a business 
purchaser where the risks of infringement of Article 85(1) or 86 exist. This 
itself might operate as a considerable disincentive to technical progress. 
208 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission of the European Communities Case T-51/89 [1990] ECR 11-309 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
HARMONISATION BY DIRECTIVE 
( ILLUSTRATED BY SOFTWARE, DURATION AND BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
INVENTIONS DIRECTIVES) 
"If you go into the labyrinth take a clew with you" 
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HARMONISATION BY D I R E C T I V E 
INTRODUCTION 
209 
210 
The use of Directives as a means towards harmonisation is perhaps best 
illustrated by the Commission's initiatives in the field of copyright, which 
began with the EEC Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of 
technology^"^ which highlighted a number of issues. Disparities were 
evident in the levels of copyright protection throughout the Community, as 
determined nationally, in spite of the Berne Convention, since minimum 
standard-setting in conformity with the Berne Convention did not result in 
uniformity of legislation above the minimum guaranteed levels of protection. 
These disparities were considered to pose obstacles to the Single Market. 
Uniformity at higher levels of protection across Member States would be the 
best way of ensuring a competitive position for the Community as this in turn 
would combat counterfeiting which was seen as a disincentive to investment. 
Effective copyright protection at a high standard was therefore taken to be in 
the economic interests of the Community and a number of Directives were 
proposed pursuant to Articles 100 and lOOA of the Treaty of Rome. Article 
100 empowers the Council to issue Directives 
"for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the Common Market."^'" 
The extent to which relations between Member States and non-EC countries 
can be regulated by Article 100A is unclear. In the Silhouette case. Advocate 
General Jacobs distinguished 
COM (88) 172 and follow up to the Green Paper COM (90) 584 
Article lOOA was added (by Article 18 of the Single European Act) to provide for qualified majority 
voting for the purpose of establishing the internal market with the opportunity for Member States to opt 
out (under Article 100A(4)) 
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"measures of commercial policy on the one hand" from "provisions 
governing the effects of trade mark rights within the Community on 
the other."2" 
To the extent that internal measures will inevitably affect relations with third 
countries. Article lOOA is capable of regulating such relations, as confirmed 
by the ECJ in that case. 
Directives then ensued on the following subjects: 
1. The legal protection of computer programs '^^  ("the Software 
Directive"). 
2. Rental and lending rights^'^ ("the Rental Right Directive"). 
3. The duration of copyright protection^"* ("the Duration Directive"). 
4. Satellite broadcasting and cable transmission^'^ 
5. The legal protection of databases^ '^  
Two of these measures, the Software Directive and the Duration Directive, 
have been selected for the purpose of this chapter to illustrate that, although 
Paragraph 46 
Council Directive 91/250 (1991) OJ L 122/42 
Council Directive 92/100 E E C of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain 
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effective to achieve some measure of harmonisation, these Directives are 
nevertheless flawed in that they fail in that aim in certain serious respects and 
at the same time aggravate the task of due diligence investigation. These 
particular measures may well have achieved significant strides beyond the 
Berne Convention but nevertheless fall short of the standard of harmonisation 
required to result in transparency throughout the Community. 
Finally, the directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions''^ 
has been chosen to highlight further some of the difficulties in adapting 
traditional forms of protection to take account of technological advances. 
B. T H E SOFTWARE D I R E C T I V E 
1. Overview 
The Software Directive was adopted on 14th May 1991 and was one of the 
earliest industry-specific harmonisation measures. It was implemented in the 
United Kingdom on 1st January 1993 by means of the Copyright (Computer 
Programs) Regulations 1992^'^ 
The Software Directive focused on specific issues, namely ownership and 
scope of protection of computer software, addressing particularly the issues 
of interface and inter-operability. In the discussion that led up to the Software 
Directive, battle-lines were drawn between the computer software giants such 
as IBM, Philips, Digital, Siemens and Apple, who belonged to the Software 
Action Group for Europe (SAGE), to lobby against exceptions to copyright 
protection to allow inter-operability, and their opponents such as Amstrad, 
Bull, Olivetti and Fujitsu who advocated it on the basis of their dependence 
on interfacing their products with the software market leaders, and formed the 
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European Committee for Inter-operable Systems (ECIS). A third group, 
comprised mainly of independent software maintainers, formed themselves 
into the group, Computer Users of Europe. 
The Software Directive was drafted as closely as possible to the Berne 
Convention and required Member States to protect computer programs as 
literary works. (The TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 10(1)) now also puts GATT members 
under obligation to protect computer programs and literary works in a similar 
way.) Computer programs are not defined (except to say that the term 
includes preparatory material), but this was deliberately done in order to offer 
greater flexibility in implementation,. The classic distinction is maintained 
between the ideas underlying the program (which are not protected by 
copyright) and their expression in the computer program (which is) 219 
Article 2 deals with the critical issue of authorship and Article 3 with 
ownership but largely leaves the matter to be determined by the laws of each 
Member State. As a simple means of arriving at consensus, this mechanism 
works but it does not result in harmonisation. Although national laws are 
broadly similar in their provisions concerning authorship and ownership, there 
will be important differences. For example, where the program is a 
commissioned work such rules are left open, because it was thought that to 
designate the commissioner as author in the Software Directive might interfere 
with the activities of the emerging self-employed sector of freelance 
programmers. Rules of authorship of commissioned works are therefore 
unharmonised. When verifying authorship and ownership, care must therefore 
be taken to ensure that differing rules in different countries are taken into 
account (since principles of national treatment apply to software as to other 
copyright works). It would have been better to have taken the opportunity to 
219 Article 1.2 
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harmonise these principles. Similar difficulties exist with computer-generated 
works where no attempt was made at harmonisation. 
The rules of authorship are not therefore simplified and this has consequences 
for housekeeping and verifying intellectual property. In the case of software, 
they are exceedingly complicated given the fact that programs themselves 
comprise contributions from a great many sources such as programmers who 
may be employees of the target owner, employees of related companies, 
secondees from unrelated entities, or freelances. The position is aggravated by 
the risks and consequences of joint ownership between any of these individuals 
and entities, which is a particular hazard of software programming. The 
stages of software development should, in a perfect world, be monitored and 
recorded, and suitable contractual documentation put in place. Given the 
importance of know-how as well as copyright, confidentiality undertakings 
should be sought from all concerned in the development of software, as well 
as express assignments of copyright and know-how from the author (if not an 
employee), though at the time of executing the assignment, if done in advance 
of the development, it may be difficult to identify the program to be produced 
or even to name it. Retrospective confirmation of the property covered by an 
assignment is necessary to link the property to the author and to ensure that 
all rights created vest properly in the target owner. There is considerable risk 
also of the creation of equitable interests in copyright, particularly where 
partnerships are involved in the creation of software^^°. 
At the heart of the Software Directive, are Articles 4, 5 and 6 which define 
the restricted acts constituting infringement, and the exceptions which do not. 
The restricted acts include "the permanent or temporary reproduction of a 
computer program by any means and in any form, in part or in whole", even 
loading, displaying, running and transmission requiring any form of 
220 Roban Jig v Taylor [1979] RFC 130 
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reproduction require authorisation^^^ Translation, adaptation or any other 
alteration of a program (as well as the reproduction of the results of those 
acts) are restricted acts^ ^^ , as also of course is distribution to the public 
(including rental). Article 4(c) expressly incorporates principles of exhaustion 
by stating, 
"the first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the right 
holder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the 
Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control 
further rental of the program or a copy thereof." 
This is a straightforward reflection of Warner v Christiansen^^^ 
distinguishing the reproduction right from the performance right, and is a 
useful confirmation of the ECJ case law in anticipation of the Rental Right 
Directive. 
Although on its face Article 4 is reasonably clear, it will at best only partially 
harmonise Member States' treatment of copyright. National differences 
concerning principles of infringement will continue to apply even if all 
countries are clear about the list of restricted acts. Different national laws 
will result in different interpretations of what constitutes infringement by each 
restricted act: for example, in the United Kingdom, reproduction must be of 
a substantial part to amount to infringement whereas in Germany the relevant 
part taken alone must contain sufficient creativity to be original, before it is 
taken to be infringed by that restricted act. 
Furthermore, the scope of restricted acts in Article 4 is so broad and general 
that the exceptions in Article 5 then become critical. This approach has been 
Article 4(a) 
Article 4(b) 
Case 158/86 [1988] E C R 2625: [1990] CMLR 684 (n. 74 above) 
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criticised by the independent maintainer lobby as too unbalanced in favour of 
the large software houses. Much of the debate surrounds the scope of 
legitimate use of a program by the user or, on the user's behalf, by 
independent maintainers of software. To the extent that the restricted acts of 
Article 4(a) and (b) are necessary for the use of the program (by authorised 
users), those restricted acts are permitted under Article 5 and this expressly 
allows use for error correction, copying for back-up purposes and reverse 
engineering. For the maintainer, the only exclusion from the list of restricted 
acts is error correction and then presumably, only to the extent that it is done 
on behalf of lawful users. Error correction, however, falls far short of the 
ful l range of activities which a maintainer is required to undertake and in this 
respect, the error correction exclusion is far too narrow. It would not, for 
example, cover adaptation to new operating systems. This is a significant 
shortcoming, especially when taken together with the pro-competitive 
ambitions of the Software Directive. The Software Directive can only be 
properly understood in the context of the developed laws of exhaustion of 
rights and competition, as expressed in the principles already covered in 
Chapters 2 and 3. However, the Software Directive does nothing to clarify 
(on the contrary, it obscures) the position concerning the application of those 
principles. 
Exhaustion 
The restricted acts referred to in Article 4(a) and (b) are only permitted if 
undertaken by the lawful user "in the absence of specific contractual 
provisions "^ '^'. It therefore appears that it is possible by contract to reinstate 
those activities as restricted acts. The interrelation between this reservation 
and the free movement content of Article 4(c) is unclear. There are two limbs 
to the issue. 
224 Article 5.1 
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The first concerns the status of the contractual reservation once the first sale 
(and exhaustion) has occurred. I f the range of restricted acts is limited by 
contract in any licence of software when first marketed, it is possible to 
interpret Article 4(c) to exhaust the distribution right in its entirety and to 
disapply contractual limits on use in relation to all restricted acts. Support 
for this possibility comes from the wording of Article 4(c) itself and also from 
the fact that there is no privity of contract between the original licensor (on 
first sale) and the user (on resale) and therefore "no specific contractual 
provision". It is unlikely that this was the intended effect of the Software 
Directive but the position is unclear. 
The second limb concerns the freedom of an original licensor to prevent 
resale. It is common to find that software licences are non-assignable and 
non-sub-licensable. I f a first sale is to exhaust the distribution right (following 
Warner v Christiansen), it must in effect render unlawful the typical non-
alienation undertaking by the first licensee. In short, in both cases, it is 
unclear on a literal interpretation of the Software Directive whether 
contractual restrictions on use and assignment are permitted at all following 
first sale. I f they are not, fundamental assumptions made in the computer 
industry are undermined. 
Article 5.2 expressly prohibits a contactual ban on making back-up copies and 
this suggests that if other contractual restrictions are prohibited, they would 
have been included at this point. It is clear from Article 9.1 that the terms of 
the Directive are "without prejudice to any other legal provisions such as 
those concerning ... . unfair competition... or the law of contract". 
Nevertheless, the Software Directive does not explain how it intends the 
principles of unfair competition or the law of contract to be applied. 
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Competition Law 
The core decompilation Articles 5 and 6 ensure that legitimate decompilation 
may occur, and this is guaranteed in the second sentence of Article 9.1 which 
specifically renders any contractual provisions to the contrary null and void. 
At the heart of Articles 5 and 6 is a policy of ensuring interface with protected 
works, to enable competition to flourish in related products that are inter-
operable with those works. The same principle is expressed in the "must f i t" 
and "must match" exceptions applicable to spare part manufacturers under 
design right and registered design protection. However, in the case of 
software, unlike design right or registered design works, considerable know-
how is needed beyond what is expressed in pure code. Article 9.1 preserves 
for the proprietor all rights in relation to "trade secrets" and "the law of 
contract" which together protect confidential information. The Software 
Directive is therefore far too limited in its effect. It applies only to written 
code and not know-how. Articles 5.3 and 6.1 do refer to know-how but not 
to confer rights of use over it. Article 5.3 permits investigation of underlying 
know-how ("ideas and principles that underlie any element of the program") 
but only while performing, " the acts of loading, displaying, running, 
transmitting or storing the program". Article 6.1 permits reproduction of the 
code if "indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the inter-
operability of an independently created program" but only if the inter-
operability know-how has not previously been readily available. 
Know-how is a vital commercial component of software, yet according to the 
Software Directive, it may be withheld. The use permitted under the Software 
Directive focuses only on the code itself and the use that may be made of the 
code that would otherwise amount to infringement. The fact that know-how 
rights are not to made available in support is striking even if the Recitals 
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acknowledge the distinction between ideas and their expression^^. The issue 
of the treatment of know-how is an important one and should be considered 
due for harmonisation. In the United Kingdom, know-how is protected by 
basic principles of confidentiality and contract. Consistency of protection 
across Member States has not been considered to be a matter of 
harmonisation. Insofar as the Software Directive deals with copyright to the 
express exclusion of know-how, it is to be regarded as an omission given the 
crucial role of know-how in any software program. Even if the Software 
Directive creates a new market in programs dependent on interface and inter-
operability with other programs, it fails to deal adequately with the entirely 
separate market of the independent maintainer which, as before, remains to 
be dealt with only as a matter of competition law. Third party maintenance 
is not legitimised by the Software Directive since maintenance goes far beyond 
error correction. Reliance must therefore be placed by maintainers on other 
sources of law. 
To the extent that the matter has been the subject of Community-wide 
consideration, it has only been incidental and accidental, by means of the 
decisions concerning Articles 85(1) and 86. First, the prohibition inherent 
in Article 85(1) against tying clauses would prevent software houses requiring 
the licensee of software to obtain maintenance services only from the licensor 
(DigitaP^^). Secondly, Article 86 and the principles established in 
MagilP" and IBM^^^. might enable the maintainer to obtain access and a 
licence to use the key component of software and know-how for providing 
maintenance services. There is every risk that the Commission would find 
"whereas for the avoidance of doubt, it has to be made clear that only the expression of a computer 
program is protected and that ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program, including 
those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected under this Directive" 
Commission Press Release IP/97/868 of 10 October 1997 
(n. 184 above) 
IBM settlement (21st Report on Competition Policy) 
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software houses to be dominant in the supply of maintenance services for their 
own software^^' unless exceptional market power is exerted by others to 
dissipate any suggestion of dominance yet it is difficult to see how others 
would find a market toehold in the absence of express licence or a widening 
of the Software Directive to cover maintenance services. As a matter of due 
diligence, this should be investigated if acting in the purchaser of a business 
or shares of a software house. The pricing policy must also be scrutinised for 
excessive or discriminatory pricing (even discounts will be sensitive Al l 
of these issues, however, require detailed market analysis and a prediction of 
the Commission's likely view of such matters. 
The underlying principle of Article 86 in this context is reflected in the 
statement of Sir Leon Brittain that, 
"companies cannot unreasonably sit on their intellectual property in 
order to stifle enterprise and prevent emergence of new forms of 
competition."^^' 
In the IBM Settlement case IBM withheld its system/370 interface information 
to prevent the emergence of inter-operable systems made by competitors. 
IBM was found to be dominant in the market for hardware which implemented 
the system/370 instruction set and the Commission dropped its investigation 
only when IBM gave undertakings to release the interface information. 
The extent to which similar information is to be made available (to reconcile 
the competing interests of SAGE and ECIS) is dealt with in the decompilation 
Article 6. The copyright holder's consent is not required for reproduction of 
the code and translation if 
Volvo V Veng. Case 238/87 [1988] E C R 6211. Renault Case 53/87 [1988] ECR 6039 
Banden-lndustrie Michelin NY v Commission Case 322/81 [1983] ECR 3461 [1985] ICMLR 282 
Commission press release 11/7/91 (IP/91/668) 
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"indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the 
inter-operability of an independently created computer program with 
other computer programs", 
provided various conditions are met, namely that it is done for the benefit of 
the lawful user, it does not go beyond the purpose of inter-operability and the 
information necessary is not readily available. The last requirement means 
that decompilation is only allowed if the interface information is not "readily 
available". I f it is, decompilation is not permitted. 
Article 6.2 places limits on the use of information acquired during 
decompilation and confines it to the goal of achieving inter-operability of the 
independently created program^^ ,^ and prevents unnecessary disclosure to 
others^". It also prevents use for the "development, production or 
marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expression", 
presumably where the information is used as a springboard for competing with 
the licensed software^^''. Article 6.2(c) in reality only prevents substantial 
similarity in the code of the newly created work which must be independent 
if it is to avoid infringement. Article 6.2(c) does not prevent the creation of 
competing programs ("other programs")^^^ provided the similarity in non-
inter-operability code does not amount to infringement. 
Before leaving the subject of competition law, it is worth noting that, quite 
apart from the competition issues raised by the Software Directive as outlined 
above, the software industry suffers from no clear guidance from the 
Commission on the status of agreements concerning computer software. This 
Article 6.2(a) 
Article 6.2(b) 
Article 6.2(c) 
Article 6.1 
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is in spite of what has been described as " the gigantic theoretical sweep of 
Article 85(1). "^ ^^  
The Commission has stated"^ ^ that it regards products protected by 
copyright in the same was as it regards products protected by patents. This 
is of little help given the peculiarities of software protection and exploitation 
already discussed. Even though classic software distribution may take the 
form of product distribution exempt under Regulation 1983/83^^ ,^ software 
distribution will nevertheless not be exempt because that Regulation only 
applies to "goods for resale"^ '^. In any event, the nature of software 
distribution is sufficiently different from that of other products that it typically 
requires restrictions concerning enforcement of intellectual property, 
confidentiality and post-term use which, though exempt under the R&D 
Regulation or Technology Transfer Regulation, are not even mentioned in 
Regulation 1983/83. Furthermore, the supplier will want to ensure that the 
user enters into contractual relations either with the supplier or the distributor 
(for the supplier's benefit) to confine software use to particular hardware, 
limited users, and to prevent reverse engineering or decompilation beyond the 
limits prescribed by the Software Directive. Al l software agreements which 
contain any such clauses should be treated with caution. 
Similarly, there is no automatic exemption for software under the Technology 
Transfer Regulation even though territorial exclusivity may well be a common 
requirement. Even if the Technology Transfer Regulation did apply to 
software, the appropriate duration of exclusivity is unclear given the copyright 
term of 70 years compared with 10 years for know-how. Use restrictions in 
Forrester: Software and Licensing in Light of Current E C Competition Law [1992] 1 E C L R 
12th Report on Competition Policy, para 162 
Commission Regulation 1983/83 of June 22nd 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of exclusive distribution agreements (1983) OJ L173/1 amended by (1983) OJ L281/2 
Article 1 
-113-
the case of exploitation are frequently imposed on the licensee, taking the 
matter outside the Technology Transfer Regulation. Also software 
transactions of this sort will not be merely ancillary to the licensing of patents 
and know-how. Reliance will therefore need to be placed on open exclusivity, 
following Nungesser^ "*". but only i f justified by the investment in the product 
in question (which will be difficult to discern case by case) in order to 
promote technical progress. 
Added to this is the uncertain status of licensee restrictions to prevent 
disclosure and use by a third party, commonly needed to ensure the protection 
of the software. Such restrictions though common, have been condemned in 
Societe du Vente de Ciments et Betons v Kerpen and Kerpen^"' and Bayo-
on-ox '^'^  as restrictions that prevent resale. The restrictions should be 
justified (though are not) on the basis of the ease of copying of software and 
also the lack of privity of contract between the initial supplier and ultimate 
user. On the other hand, site restrictions are generally justified since they 
form the basis of the charging structure and the licence fee^ '*^ 
Due Diligence 
If a core asset of a target business is software written to take advantage of the 
exceptions afforded by the Software Directive, it may be extremely difficult 
to verify that the software has been written in such a way as to avoid 
infringement. 
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Case 258/78 Nungesser v Commission [1982] E C R 2015 (n. 181 above) 
Case 319/82 [1983] E C R 4173 
OJ (1990) L22/71 [1990] 4 CMLR 930 
Coditel V Cine Vog Films Case 262/81 [1982] E C R 3381 [1983] 1 CMLR 49 
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First, the principle of national treatment for software (as confirmed by the 
Software Directive) will result in differing standards of infringement across 
Member States. National treatment multiplies the time and expense of any due 
diligence investigation as it requires examination of the laws of the Member 
States in which the software is to be marketed. However, the rules of national 
treatment are to be read subject to the reciprocity principle and this itself will 
require the laws of all applicable territories to be examined for the presence 
of any disparity in protection between the countries (inside and outside the 
EEA) where protection is intended. To the extent that such things as the 
meaning of "infringement" are not harmonised, the Software Directive also 
fails to render harmonisation to software protection even if it defines certain 
activities as "restricted acts": the test for infringement (such as substantiality) 
remains a matter for national determination and trans-national anomalies 
remain across the Community. This is the case even if under the Software 
Directive all Member States protect software as literary works and apply to 
it the benefit of the same restricted acts (and exceptions to restricted acts). 
Secondly, an evaluation of whether a program written to be inter-operable 
with an existing program and used in a business is within the terms of the 
Software Directive will require detailed discussion with the creator of the 
interface of the existing program. Whether there is an infringement depends 
on whether any code within Article 5.3 was examined "while performing any 
of the acts of loading, displaying, etc....". Any information which is 
obtainable by further acts will be unlawfully obtained. The extent to which 
permissible decompilation occurs under Article 6.1 depends on what is 
"indispensable" to achieve inter-operability and depends on use that is 
"necessary" to achieve inter-operability. Verification of these limits is a 
purely technical matter and the program creator is not generally the best judge 
of what the Software Directive permits. Even then, the resulting program 
must not be "substantially similar in its expression" to the original (beyond the 
interface elements). 
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The Correct Form of Protection? 
It is to be remembered that sui generis protection was not given to software 
because the lesson learned from the US Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
1984 was that such an approach would incur many years of debate and delay. 
In any event, the Berne Convention was considered to provide a readily 
available framework of international protection for software based on 
copyright. 
At the same time, in the United Kingdom copyright protection has also proved 
to be too narrow and has been extended to cover such matters as non-literary 
copyright to cover structure, sequence and organisation "^*^ and look and feel. 
A non-literal approach has proved necessary because if infringement is 
confined only to literal copying, it is easy to escape infringement. For 
example, in John Richardson Computers Limited v Flanders '^*^ although no 
text of the source code or object code had been reproduced, profound 
similarity in the operation of the programs (look and feel) were attributable 
to copying a substantial part of the original program from recollection of its 
main routings and functions amounting to infringement. The judgment has 
been criticised for conferring copyright on functions, but the decision reflects 
the need to expand on "literal" interpretation of protection for literary works 
as adopted by the Software Directive. The principle established in John 
Richardson has been confirmed in IBCOS Computers Limited v Barclays 
Mercantile Highland Finance Limited and others^ "^  which, although a case 
of literal copying, explained the significance of ideas as follows: 
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Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory. [1987] FSR 1 
1993 FSR 497 
1994 FSR 275 
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"Where an "idea" is sufficiently general, then even if an original work 
embodies it, the mere taking of the idea will not infringe. But if the 
"idea" is detailed, then there may be infringement. It is a question of 
degree. The same applies whether the work is functional or not and 
whether visual or literary". 
This case nevertheless highlights the importance of know-how and ideas 
beyond the lines of written code, a feature not adequately recognised by the 
Software Directive. 
Summary 
The last recital of the first Proposal for the Software Directive '^*'' gave as 
one aim of the Software Directive the need for common rules to avoid 
restrictions on circulation due to diverging intellectual property protection. 
Secondly, it also emphasised the need to stimulate research and investment. 
The differing rules of copyright protection accorded by national treatment 
militate against the first aim and the lack of consistency in protection, 
following the Berne Convention, is not sufficiently recognised. The lack of 
protection for know-how by adhering inappropriately to literary copyright 
stifles the second aim. Research and investment is also stifled in the field of 
software maintenance because independent maintainers will only operate if 
they are prepared to run the gauntlet with the major software houses on the 
principles that favour them under the Magill and IBM cases but that is a risk 
that few would take with any comfort. The Recitals to the Software Directive 
confirm that it is without prejudice to the rules of competition in Articles 
85(1) and 86 yet these are blunt (and expensive) instruments in the hands of 
the independent maintainers. Even in the case of those who write inter-
operable programs (rather than maintain existing ones) the balancing rights of 
access to inter-operable information and the right of the proprietors to control 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Software Programs (1989) OJ C 91/4 
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this by making such interface information available in a limited way are 
difficult to interpret. They are even harder to interpret in the light of Article 
86. Protection for expression in the case of software is too broad and for 
ideas is too narrow. 
It is worth observing that Jean-Francois Verstrynge who has been described 
as principal promoter in the field of intellectual property within the EC, 
regards the Software Directive as the first successful copyright harmonisation 
exercise of the Community^"^. Others have commented that the EC has set 
the standard for WIPO discussions and this Software Directive offers a 
"universal guideline" preceding other copyright Directives^'''. It is 
submitted that it is inappropriate to regard the Software Directive as providing 
such a model. Later Directives in the sphere of copyright are equally if not 
more flawed, notably the Duration Directive^^", which will now be 
considered. 
DURATION D I R E C T I V E 
Introduction 
Discussion of due diligence would be incomplete without illustration of at least 
some of the issues close to the surface which require investigation on 
acquisition of intellectual property. The Duration Directive has been selected 
for the purposes of this illustration for two reasons. First, it exemplifies some 
of the obstacles resulting from the earliest attempts of international 
harmonisation (in the loosest sense) by means of the Berne and Paris 
Conventions already discussed, the principle aim of which was to provide for 
certain minimum standards, reciprocity of protection and international 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs in Europe. Guide to the E C Directive, Butterworth 1991 
Bridget Czernota and Robert J Hart Book Review (1993) 3 EIPR 
Council Directive 93/98 (1993) OJ 290/9 (n. 214 above) 
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cooperation in enforcement. The Duration Directive therefore serves to 
demonstrate some of the challenges faced by the Commission in reconciling 
its ambitions of true harmonisation with the legacy of international cooperation 
over the preceding century. Secondly, it highlights the sheer complexity of 
due diligence verification, the conclusion being that it is in reality 
impracticable in the context of copyright but made worse by the Duration 
Directive. 
Due Diligence Steps Illustrated 
The purpose of due diligence investigation should be the verification of 
ownership of all rights conveyed by assignment or licence by the owner of 
intellectual property and determination of the scope and duration of the rights, 
in particular the extent to which the restricted acts amounting to infringement 
are, or are not, enforceable. 
I f the process is capable of being described systematically, it might be said to 
involve the following steps. These steps reflect the position in the United 
Kingdom with regard to copyright before the Duration Directive came into 
being. (For the sake of simplicity, the illustration assumes that there are no 
design right works, patents, registered designs or know-how of relevance 
though in practice these obviously should themselves also be investigated 
thoroughly.) 
a. Products 
Al l products for which a business is acquired must be identified. 
b. Copvright Works 
For each product, all constituent copyright works must be identified. 
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Restricted Acts 
The manner of exploitation of the products must be identified to 
establish the extent to which restricted acts of copyright are the 
intended source of business revenue. For example, publishers and film 
producers are dependent on restricted acts of copyright as the basis for 
deriving their income but library and information providers are not, 
even though they all have in common trade based on delivery of 
copyright works. Clearly, those businesses dependent on copyright 
(which will generally be the rule) will need to establish the scope of 
copyright protection in terms of the particular restricted acts, the 
geographical coverage and duration of protection for business plan 
purposes. 
Subsistence 
For each copyright work, it must be established that copyright subsists 
in the case of literary, dramatic or musical works. Subsistence 
depends on a multiplicity of factors including the following: 
i . Whether the work was "published" within the meaning of 
Section 175(1) of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
("CPDA"). I f the work was not published then see (iv) below. 
i i . Where the work was "first published". First publication must 
have been in the United Kingdom or a country listed in 
Schedule 1 to the Copyright (Application to Other Countries) 
Order 1993 (subject to certain date restrictions applicable to 
certain countries) ("the 1993 Order"). Reliance can not be 
placed on whether or by whom the work was made (under (iv) 
below) if the work was first published outside a "qualifying 
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country". Simultaneous publication in a qualifying and a non-
qualifying country will suffice for protection where publication 
occurs in those countries within fourteen days of each 
other^ '^. 
i i i . When the work was published. I f before 1 August 1989 (when 
CPDA came into force) the author (or one of them if in joint 
ownership) must have been a "relevant person" then, or if 
dead, at publication the author must have been a "relevant 
person" on the date of death^^ .^ I f first published after 1 
August 1989, the author must have been a "qualifying person" 
then, or if dead at publication the author must have been a 
"qualifying person" on the date of death (Section 155 of the 
iv. When the work was made. The author must have been a 
"qualifying person" when the work was made for copyright to 
subsist. 
V . The date when certain countries acceded. As countries have 
acceded to the Berne Convention, copyright has arisen in works 
which, until then had not been protected. Care must be taken 
to examine any disposition of copyright during which there was 
no copyright protection in any country in which copyright 
Under the 1956 and subsequent Copyright Acts, simuUaneous publication of a work in different 
countries may take place within thirty days of each other (Section 49(2)(d) and Schedule 7, para 33(1) 
of the C P D A ) 
"relevant person" under Article 2(2) of SI 1989/1293 means a Commonwealth citizen, a British 
protected citizen, a citizen or subject of any country specified in Schedule 1 to 1993 Order or a person 
domicile or resident in the U K , another country to which Part I of the C P D A extends or a country 
specified in Schedule 1 to the 1989 Order. 
"Qualifying person" is defined to mean (a) a "relevant person" (as above) or (b), a British Dependent 
Territories citizen, a British National (overseas), a British Overseas citizen, or (c) a body incorporated 
under the law of the United Kingdom or any country to which Part I of the C P D A extends 
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protection is required, as copyright may not be transferred by 
that disposition. It would not be possible to rely on the 
disposition as an instrument to transfer rights that did not exist 
at the date of the disposition^^". 
vi i . Whether the countries still exist. Further difficulties arise with 
countries that cease to exist such as was the case with many 
countries of the former Soviet Union. This has partly been 
cured by the 1993 Order which does recognise particular 
succession states but potential exists in the future where similar 
political changes occur, at least until appropriate Order clarifies 
the position. 
As far as films are concerned, under the CPDA, the determination of 
the extent of copyright protection requires the above analysis for each 
component part of the f i lm. For example, the script will be protected 
as a literary work, the sound track as a sound recording in turn 
comprising a musical work (musical score) and a literary work 
(lyrics)), the set perhaps as an artistic work, the treatment or synopsis 
also as a literary work, and the plot or scenario as a dramatic work. 
The fi lm recording itself in addition will be protected as a film which 
also fixes performances (themselves protected by corresponding 
performance rights^^^). The director and all originators of literary, 
dramatic, musical works and artistic works will possess moral 
rights^^^ A l l of these rights will need to be cleared in favour of the 
producer by assignment and disclaimer from the originator. 
The position is particularly unclear with regard to certain translation rights in works of foreign origin 
which before 1988 had been in the public domain but which were revived on 1 August 1989 by virtue 
of the C P D A Schedule 1 paragraph 35, (causing the importation of translations to amount to 
infringement after that date but not before). 
under Part II of the C P D A 
under Part I of Chapter IV of the C P D A 
-122-
257 
258 
To the extent that the film itself is made from other works, such as 
plays or novels, rights in those third party literary works must also be 
cleared. 
Al l clearances of any constituent work must be in sufficiently broad 
terms to contemplate all intended exploitation, not merely as films but 
as multi-media products if appropriate, on different media and by 
different means of transmission (such as electronic or satellite 
transmission). Al l clearances of any integral work by disclaimer or 
assignment must be checked for the extent to which they contemplate 
all new media according to established rules of contract 
construction^". 
The purchaser or licensee of f i lm rights must also take account of the 
different rules applicable under the 1911 Copyright Act (which 
regarded cinematography as photography and as such the creation of 
artistic works in each frame, and the capture of dramatic works^^ )^ 
and the 1956 Copyright Act (which combined into the fi lm both the 
visual images and soundtrack). Each Act gave different treatment to 
the meaning of f i lm, the sounds that were taken to be part of it, the 
dramatic content, the position of the producer, the expiry of copyright 
and the meaning of infringement. Matters are further complicated by 
the transitional provisions between the Acts of 1911, 1956 and 1988 
(particularly as the 1956 Act has numerous commencement dates). 
Space does not permit further elaboration of the rules of subsistence 
also for publications, sound recordings, broadcasts, and cable 
programmes which themselves contain different constituent copyright 
Hospital for Sick Children v Walt Disney Productions Inc [1966] 2 A E R 321 
Section 35(1) 
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works for which copyright subsistence will need to be determined in 
a similar way but according to different rules. 
e. Establish Ownership of Al l Works 
For each work, the owner must obviously be established, as 
determined by Section 11 of the CPDA. The first owner will be the 
author unless the work was created in the course of employment, in 
which case the employer will be the first owner (but only if the 
employer is a qualifying person^^'). I f created during the course of 
employment, the terms of employment must not be inconsistent with 
Section 11. 
In the case of computer-generated works, ownership must be 
ascertained and will accrue to the creator or the person who made the 
necessary arrangements for the creation of the work^^°. 
As far as works of joint authorship are concerned, all joint owners 
must have assigned or licensed their rights, otherwise the exploitation 
of the work and subsequent infringement proceedings will be hampered 
by the need of consent of all joint owners^*\ 
f. Formalities 
The first owner (assuming it is not the vendor or licensor) must have 
assigned copyright and waived all moral rights in favour of any 
predecessor in title from the vendor or licensor, and the chain of 
documentation must be complete (with stamp duty duly paid, and in 
Sections 11 and 154 of the C P D A 
Section 9(3) of the C P D A 
Section 10 of the C P D A 
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compliance with all formalities laid down in Section 90 of the CPDA 
or any predecessor Act). The original assignment should contain 
warranties concerning authorship, subsistence, ownership and 
qualification. 
An assignment must be in writing but a licence need not be. However 
an exclusive licence obviously should be in writing as a means of 
evidencing locus standi for the licensee as plaintiff in infringement 
proceedings. An assignment may be of future copyright and when it 
arises it may take effect so as to vest automatically in the assignee, 
although this is likely to be ineffective unless a retrospective 
confirmation is made to identify the works with that assignment. 
g. Other Miscellaneous Matter Must Be Established Including: 
i . the scope of any application to the Copyright Tribunal under 
Chapter VI I of Part I of the CPDA (Licensing Schemes) 
i i . whether the vendor of licensor has been subject to any 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission references. 
i i i . whether the Crown might claim Crown copyright under 
Chapter X of Part I of the CPDA. 
iv. whether any works were published in any patent application (if 
so an implied licence will be granted^ *"^ ) 
V . whether any licences granted by the vendor or any predecessor 
in title are inconsistent with any assignment or licence under 
examination. 
Catnic Components v Hill & Smith 1978 F S R 405 
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vi . whether the principles of "national treatment" and 
"reciprocity" limit use in any overseas territory. 
v i i . whether protection is reduced by reason of concurrent design 
right protection. (Section 51(1) of the CPDA that 
"it is not an infringement of any copyright in a design 
document or model recording or in embodying a design 
for anything other than an artistic work or typeface to 
make an article to the design or to copy an article made 
to the design".) 
vi i i . whether the Software Directive erodes the range the restricted 
acts^ *^  
This is a gross oversimplification of some of the issues out of a myriad that 
require verification. As a summary it does not do justice even to basic 
principles. However, the items listed do at least help to illustrate that the 
level of protection given to copyright works in one sense has less to do with 
affording protection to the creator, as a reward for the creative effort in 
making the work, than the international political scene. The inadvertent 
consequence is that verification of copyright subsistence, ownership, scope and 
duration is extremely difficult and dependent on innumerable factors. 
Incomplete knowledge may well produce the wrong result. For example, a 
pre-1956 work known to be of British authorship carmot be assumed to be 
protected by copyright in the United Kingdom unless its date and place of first 
publication are known. The result of an extraordinary matrix of differing 
regimes and transitional provisions is that exhaustive due diligence is not 
Increasingly, with multi-media products, other areas of law are relevant to the due diligence exercise, 
for example, the Software Directive will have a direct bearing. Software written with the express 
purpose of providing the interface between products in different media will be particularly at risk of 
being unprotected as a result of the Software Directive, since much of the software in interactive 
products is written specifically to provide interoperability function. 
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feasible. The purchaser or licensee cannot easily know what is conveyed and 
the vendor or licensee cannot easily warrant the scope of protection. 
In fairness, this level of complexity results not so much from EC legislation 
as the basic harmonisation measures expressed in the Conventions (Berne and 
Paris) that preceded the Single Market. The law in 1988 merely reflects the 
United Kingdom's response to its obligations under those Conventions without 
specific adjustment for the purposes of the Single Market^*". Nevertheless, 
it is with good reason that with the advent of the Duration Directive, the law 
of copyright is said to be so complicated that to understand it properly would 
take a lifetime, plus seventy years. 
Effect of the Directive 
The Duration Directive was issued on 29 October 1993 among other things 
"to establish a legal environment conducive to the harmonious development 
of literary and artistic creation in the Community"^^^ and for the 
"development of creativity in the interests of authors, cultural industries, 
consumers and society as a whole"^^^. It is noteworthy that the Directive 
was issued without public consultation. The effect of the Directive, in short, 
was to extend the copyright term in the case of all specified works which were 
still in copyright in at least one EEA country on 1 July 1995, so that they all 
expire at the same date, namely seventy years after the death of the author. 
The result is that in those countries in which the copyright had already expired 
it had to be revived. The United Kingdom is a notable example as it generally 
offered f if ty years protection to works where elsewhere, such as Germany, 
corresponding works were protected for seventy years. To ascertain whether 
except, for example, the scope protection given to semi-conductor topographies following Council 
Directive 8 7 / 5 4 / E E C (1987) OJ L24/36 
Recital 11 
Recital 10 
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copyright in a work is to be revived therefore requires an exhaustive 
examination of the laws of all EE A countries, to determine whether the work 
was protected in any one country on 1 July 1995. This also requires an 
examination, not only of the rules of duration in all those countries but also 
of whether the law of any country relied upon as applying a sufficiently long 
term indeed provides copyright protection to the work in question at that date. 
Equivalent rules for subsistence, qualification, ownership and scope of 
protection applicable under United Kingdom law (only some of which were 
listed above) will need to be scrutinised for each such country. 
In the case of expired works at the effective date of the Duration Directive, 
the difficulties are considerable for businesses relying on the fact that 
copyright has expired in certain works. There are limited provisions to assist 
in Articles 10.2 and 10.3. Article 10.3 explains that the Duration Directive 
is "without prejudice to any acts of exploitation performed before" the 
copyright revives. For publishing businesses this is a very real issue. Works 
may deliberately have been selected for publication for the very reason that 
they have fallen into the public domain, only to be restored by the Duration 
Directive. It is unclear to what extent continued publication or even reediting 
may occur after the revival date since these are not activities undertaken 
"before" the date of revival. Regulation 23 of the Regulations which enact 
the Duration Directive into English law^^ ^ do little to clarify the position. 
As a separate but related matter, any clearance or licence by the author 
granted to the publisher must also be examined to determine whether it was 
for a fixed period (in which case it would be unaffected by the Duration 
Directive) or intended to be for the ful l life of the copyright term. This is a 
matter of contract construction which will vary from country to country, and 
is an uncertainty introduced by the Duration Directive. 
267 Copyright and Related Right Regulations 1996 SI 1996/2967 
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For f i lm producers, matters are made considerably more complicated also by 
the fact that, for United Kingdom law, the Duration Directive introduced 
fundamental changes to the rules of authorship of films. Under the CPDA, 
the producer was author and first owner (assuming the producer made the 
necessary arrangements). According to the Duration Directive^^^, the 
principal film director is author or at least a co-author although Member States 
are free to designate others. The range of authors whose works require 
clearance widens. For component works, the complexities of clearance to 
take account of revived copyright and the extension of the copyright term to 
seventy years are multiplied. Article 22 of the Duration Directive extends the 
term of protection to 
"seventy years after the death of the last of the following persons to 
survive, whether or not those persons are designated as authors; the 
principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the 
dialogue and the composer of music specifically created for use in the 
cinematographic.. .work." 
For anyone acquiring fi lm rights a great deal is required to be known (inter 
alia) about the detailed personal circumstances of the contributors' nationality 
and death. I f the Duration Directive is said to be in the interests of the rights 
holder, this cannot be said of fi lm producers who will have to pay royalties 
for a greater term than before. The cost of verification will also increase as 
the complexity of the task increases. 
The cost and uncertainty to fi lm producers is also aggravated by Council 
Directive 92/100/EEC^^' which confers on authors and performers (as well 
as producers) the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit rental and lending of 
Article 2(1) 
on rental right and lending right and on certain rights relating to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property (1992) OJ L 346/61 
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originals and copies of copyright works. These rights may be the subject of 
licences^™ (as they must or they would have no economic value) but the 
additional right to "equitable remuneration" provided for in Article 4 is 
unwaivable by the author or performer who is the beneficiary of that right in 
relation to rental of films and sound recordings. No guidance is given 
concerning the level of remuneration that is "equitable". The only certainty 
is that the producer must bear the cost of paying it even if distribution is 
carried out by a distributor rather than the producer. 
Rental and lending rights are also conferred on the principal director even 
though under United Kingdom law, directors would already have the benefit 
of moral rights. 
It is noteworthy that the Duration Directive clarified 
"That the harmonisation brought about by this Directive does not apply 
to moral rights."^^' 
Waivers of moral rights will therefore need to be sought from any author or 
contributor found in any country to be entitled to moral rights, and the 
Duration Directive provides no consistency across different countries. 
Other anomalies include the fact that no mention is made of computer-
generated works. Their term of protection is unharmonised, presumably kept 
in line with the level of protection given to software. 
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Summary 
In summary, three main criticisms might be levelled against the Duration 
Directive. First, it might usefully be judged by the Regulations that were 
necessary under United Kingdom law to give effect of the Duration Directive. 
Those Regulations have resulted in one of the most complicated enactments 
known to the statute books. 
Secondly, the Duration Directive has paid insufficient regard to the fact that 
copyright works, even well before the time for formulating the Duration 
Directive, were becoming increasingly "dematerialised" by electronic and 
digital exploitation. It has therefore become inappropriate to preserve the 
distinctions between different works carried in different media and yet this 
striking global transition has been ignored in the Duration Directive. 
Harmonisation has at best been achieved only for works falling in the same 
category where the categories are still defined by the medium in which works 
are carried or by their method of creation. For example, computer-generated 
have a harmonised term but it is different from the harmonised term for films, 
an approach that is manifestly inappropriate when the medium is increasingly 
irrelevant in a digital era. 
Thirdly, if the Duration Directive is thought to offer greater economic gain 
to authors by extending the copyright term, it is to be remembered that 
generally very few works still have an economic life between fifty and seventy 
years following the author's death. 
Fourthly, the Duration Directive might have ignored other sources of law. It 
has been suggested by Weyer Verloren Van Themaat and Wolter Weffers 
Bettink^^^ that Article 234 of the Treaty requires precedence to be given to 
earlier Treaty obligations towards non-EU countries than the Treaty of Rome 
"Another Side of the Story" — Wever Verloren Van Themaat and Wolter Weffers Bettink (1995) 6 
E I P R 307 
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itself dated 25 March 1957. The principles of reciprocity in the Berne convention 
Articles 2(7) (for applied art), 6(1) (protection of works of contracting country 
nationals), and 7(8) (the copyright period) might render open to challenge the 
entire Duration Directive^^l It is still possible therefore that the old principles of 
reciprocity apply under the Berne convention in spite of the Duration Directive. 
The uncertainties for due diligence will then be insuperable. 
D. T H E D I R E C T I V E FOR PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS 
1. Introduction 
Biotechnology is the cornerstone of development of pharmaceutical products and 
healthcare systems, heavily dependant upon the patent system for the reward of 
high risk investment. The patent system stands to suffer erosion from the 
developing case law of the ECJ, most recently reflected in Merck v Primecrown 
in circumstances of lack of uniformity of patent protection across Member States. 
This section examines some of the content of the Biotech Directive and considers 
its ability to achieve its aims in the light of these limitations. In particular, the 
adverse consequences to pharmaceutical manufacturers of the decision in Merck 
V Primecrown are likely to be perpetuated, rather than cured, in particular due to 
lack of consistency in patent protection permitted on such crucial developments 
determined by the issue of morality. The pharmaceutical industry is dependant on 
biotechnological advances based on long term reward from investment. 
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The same also applies to the draft Regulation on the Community Design (Proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Designs) O J (1993) C 345/14). Article 100(3) addresses 
reciprocity as follows: 
"Every Member State shall admit to the protection under its law of copyright a design protected by 
a Community Design which fulfils the conditions required by such law, even if in another member 
state which is the country of origin of the design, the latter does not fulfil the conditions of protection 
under the law of that State". 
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The Commission's second Proposal for a directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions"" successfully completed its first reading in the 
European Parliament on 16 July 1997. A revised Proposal was submitted on 19th 
November 1997. It was approved by the European Parliament following its 
second reading wdthout amendment and adopted on 30 July 1998"^ ("the Biotech 
Directive"). It is submitted that the European patent system is an inadequate 
starting point for the purpose of regulating national laws on the subject of the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions and this third Directive is chosen to 
illustrate the importance of the inter-relation of different sources of law when 
devising measures of harmonisation of intellectual property law. 
The aim of the Biotech Directive is to harmonize certain divergences in Member 
States' protection of biotechnological inventions, which might result in the 
fragmentation of the Single Market, Member States have achieved partial 
harmonisation through alignment with the European Patent Convention ("EPC"). 
However the EPC is limited in its ability to achieve harmonisation. Dating back 
more than thirty years it only touches on a few of the ethical and conceptual issues 
raised by recent scientific advances in molecular biology involving the 
manipulation of self-reproducible biological materials within human, animal and 
plant cell systems. The EPC is also limited by virtue of Article 2(2) which states: 
"The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it 
is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a 
national patent granted by that State." 
Furthermore, case law decided by the European Patent Office ("EPO") is not 
firmly established (as acknowledged by the Commission). The President of the 
EPO frequently resorts to the Enlarged Board of Appeal to attempt uniform 
Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions C O M (97) 446 F I N A L (1997) O J C311/12 
OJ(1998) L213/98 
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application of the law. This results in delays, compounded by the tendency of 
national courts to defer judgment pending EPO final decisions even if those 
decisions are not binding on them. 
Content of the Biotech Directive 
Much of the content of the Biotech Directive is directed at the distinction between 
what is patentable and what is not. The EPC criteria of patentability are, not 
surprisingly, preserved. Excluded under Article 53 of the EPC are inventions 
contrary to morality^^*, plant and animal varieties, and biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals^". However, microbiological processes and the 
products of microbiological processes are not excluded from patentability~^^ All 
of these principles are restated in the Biotech Directive but are intended to be 
clarified in the context of the legal protection for living matter. 
The Biotech Directive focuses on the issue of patentability aside from the issue of 
morality. It is clear from Article 5 that the human body at its various stages of 
formation and development and the simple discovery of one of its elements, 
including the sequences or partial sequence of a gene, cannot be patentable. There 
are many human genes that code for pharmaceutically active products such as 
insulin, human growth hormones, or interferons. Patentable inventions may, for 
example, now cover processes for the production of a hormone only if "isolated 
from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process" '^'. 
However, no patent may be granted on the hormone (or other element) in situ. 
Articles 3 confirms the patentability of biological material, microbiological 
processes and their products within prescribed limits that indicate the deliberate 
E P C Article 53(a) 
E P C Article 53(b) 
E P C Article 53(b) 
Article 3.2 
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positioning of the Biotech Directive in the context of other intellectual property 
rights, in particular, plant breeder's rights. "Biological material" is defined as "any 
material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being 
reproduced in a biological system"^ *". Plant (and animal) varieties as such are 
excluded from patentability under Article 4.1(a) even if they would otherwise fall 
within the definition of "biological material." Article 4.1(b) excludes from 
patentability, "essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals" being processes consisting entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing 
or selection. 
Protection afforded by the Biotech Directive therefore expressly excludes plant 
breeder's rights. This is to be expected since the Directive aims to maintain, as 
much as possible, the existing order of the EPC which in Article 53(b) of the EPC 
excludes the patentability of plant varieties. It should nevertheless be questioned 
whether a regime of protection other than the patent system is appropriate for the 
protection of biological materials and processes. 
3. Morality 
280 
The issue of morality is one of political controversy and its treatment under the 
Directive exposes significant shortcomings in its harmonisation aims. Article 6(1) 
of the Directive is superficially similar to Article 53(a) of the EPC although it uses 
the new term, "public policy", when stating, "Inventions shall be considered 
unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to public 
policy or morality." The familiar EPC Article 53(a), by contrast, excludes, 
"inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre 
public or morality." Even though Article 53 has proved notoriously difficult to 
interpret, the departure from the language of Article 53 will result in the loss of 
usefijl EPO case law and will raise doubts concerning the intention behind the new 
reference to public policy in the English text. The French text refers to "ordre 
Article 2.1(a) 
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public" which only serves to obscure the Commission's intention. It has been 
suggested (by Ford^^')) that differences in the wording of Article 53 of the EPC 
and Article 6 of the Directive are sufficient to result in confusion as to the 
obligations of States which are members of both the EU and the EPC, even 
though the Directive has no immediate impact on the EPC. Guidance is given in 
Article 6.2(a) to (d) of the Directive in relation to isolated examples of 
unpatentable inventions "on the basis of paragraph 1", i.e. excluded by reason of 
Article 6.1, and these are processes for cloning human beings, processes for 
modifying the germ-line or genetic identity of human beings, uses of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes and processes for modifying the 
genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause suffering without substantial 
benefit to man or animal and also animals resulting from such processes. Clearly 
the onset of oncological suffering in animals in the pursuit of a cure for cancer 
might be justified but not a similar level of suffering in the pursuit of a cure for 
pattern baldness. The exclusions illustrated non-exhaustively in Article 6(2) will 
no doubt undergo revision by the addition of new microbiological techniques not 
foreseeable today and possibly might subsequently permit techniques which are in 
future refined in such a way as to satisfy concerns of morality; for example, germ 
line gene therapy targeted to prevent the inheritance of selected defective genes. 
The uncertain and subjective nature of the issue of morality, at the heart of so 
many current pharmaceutical developments, may yet result in inconsistent 
practices when granting patents, the very thing that the Directive aimed to 
prevent. 
The Biotech Directive's Interface with other systems of Protection 
The application of the Biotech Directive is likely to prove difficult in view of the 
interface between existing systems of protection; in particular that between patent 
and plant breeder's protection. 
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It has been suggested by Llewelyn^*^ that the protection of plant variety rights 
under the Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation (CPVR)^^^ might provide 
a better avenue for setting minimum standards among Member States for the 
protection of biological matter. The CPVR is aimed at protecting living matter of 
a botanical genus or species outside the patent system, principally to reward plant 
breeders for their investment in creating new varieties. Plant varieties were not 
originally considered appropriate for patent protection because the creation of 
plant material for propagation is said to lack the essential patent requirements of 
novelty and inventive step. Also, a level of protection falling far short of a patent 
monopoly was considered appropriate in order to encourage free transmission of 
plant material amongst plant breeders, for the public good. 
As a result, plant breeders protection and patent protection exist quite separately 
under their own mutually exclusive systems of administration according to 
different rules and criteria, offering different levels of protection to the rights 
holder. This separation of systems has given rise to practical difficulties as 
illustrated by the case of Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors 
Article 53(b) of the EPC deals with various exclusions from patent protection, 
including plant varieties. The Board of Appeal in that case interpreted plant 
varieties in such as way as to exclude plant material from patent protection and 
disallowed a claim (which was held to encompass unpatentable subject matter) 
under Article 53(b). The significance of this case in the context of a rapidly 
emerging science based on the manipulation of genetic material in animals, humans 
and plants is that the established boundaries between the existing systems of 
protection and that set out in the Biotech Directive are difficult to fix conceptually 
and harder still to apply in reality. The case turned to a large extent on whether 
the insertion of a single gene into plant material constituted a plant variety under 
Llewelyn: The Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (1997) 3EIPR 115 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights (1994) OJ L227/1 
EPO Decision T 356/93 [1995] EPOR 357 
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the UPOV Convention^*^ (implemented in the form of the CPVR) and accordingly 
whether it should be excluded from patent protection under Article 53(b) of the 
EPC. A plant variety is defined in Article 1 of the UPOV Convention as a "single 
botanical taxon of the lowest known rank... irrespective of whether the conditions 
for the grant of a breeders right can be met...[suitable] for being propagated 
unchanged". 
Until clarified by the Biotech Directive, the result of this case has, it is submitted, 
wrongly been that the potential that exists for genetically modified seeds and 
plants to become plant varieties excludes them from patent protection. This case 
demonstrates that the inter-relation between patent and plant breeder protection 
needs to be redefined as a matter of policy especially given the increasing practice 
of gene manipulation using plant material to devise therapeutic products for 
human use. 
Even i f that decision is corrected and clarified by the Biotech Directive, it 
nevertheless forewarns of difficulties in the application of the Directive. It is 
submitted that adherence to Article 53(b) of the EPC as a means of avoiding dual 
protection with plant breeder's rights is no longer appropriate. Plant breeder's 
rights emerged at a time when the UPOV Convention in 1961 addressed only the 
limited scientific uses of reproductive vegetative material as a means of plant 
propagation. I f a given technology uses plant propagation as a production system 
for healthcare, environmental or other applications, there appears to be no 
compelling reason why those aspects traditionally given to plant breeder's rights 
should be excluded from patent protection. Take, for example, a plant variety 
which possesses pharmaceutical properties created as a means for achieving 
micro-processes which result in pharmaceutical products. 
It is recognised that dual protection is undesirable. Rather than follow the pattern 
of Article 53 of the EPC to exclude plant breeder's rights from patent protection. 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
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Llewelyn argues that excluding from plant variety protection any variety which is 
the subject of a patent for that variety would result in greater consistency. This 
would avoid complications of determining the scope of plant variety rights when 
excluding them from patent law. More importantly, it would provide uniformity 
of protection to biotechnological materials which are not intended to be used by 
plant breeders. It may also do away with some of the diflRcuhies that are 
anticipated in interpreting the patentability exclusion in Article 4 of the Directive 
of "essentially biological processes for the production of plants". 
The Biotech Directive's Interface with other sources of Law 
Departure fi-om Article 53 would be a useful first step in discouraging resort to the 
EPC as a tool for harmonisation when (as noted above) the EPC is an inadequate 
instrument to achieve that purpose. It is to be regretted that the Commission's 
focus in the Biotech Directive is to clarify the application of the EPC rather than 
address the shortcomings of the EPC or indeed the conflict between the EPC and 
other instruments. For example. Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement^ ^^ states 
that Members may exclude from patentability certain inventions which should be 
prevented from exploitation to protect public order or morality including the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to 
the environment. By contrast. Article 53(a) of the EPC states that patents shall 
not be granted to inventions which, when exploited, would be contrary to 
morality. Article 27.2 of TRIPS and Article 53 of the EPC do not correspond, yet 
Article 6 of the Biotech Directive attempts only to clarify Article 53. Issues of 
morality have proved notoriously difficult to determine as part of the patent 
system (especially Article 53) and there is much to be said for detaching public 
policy issues of morality fi-om the regime of intellectual property (as contemplated 
in Article 27(3) of TRIPS) especially when it is no longer appropriate to confine 
the protection of rapidly advancing technologies only to patent rights. 
286 Adopted as part of the "Final Agreement" of the GATT Uraguay Round 
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A watching eye needs to be maintained on other fronts. Ford suggests that there 
may be scope for those wishing to object to the grant of biotechnology patents on 
moral grounds (such as the Oncomouse patent) to appeal to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)^" on the basis that the Contracting States 
to the EPC were already bound to the terms of the ECHR, and that the latter 
should prevail in determining whether an EPC patent should be granted, whether 
or not the ECHR had been incorporated. It is argued that questions of morality 
under the EPC, the Biotech Directive, even under TRIPS (Article 27.2) at least 
in the confines of Europe, should all be interpreted to give ascendancy to the 
ECHR according to the rules of interpretation of Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention^^^ i f only to prevent the contravention of rights derived from 
the ECHR. Whatever the scope of this principle, it serves to illustrate that in the 
Biotech Directive the Commission has failed to take adequate account of other 
sources of law (even its own) in order to achieve its goal of harmonisation. 
Summary 
In conclusion, lack of consistency with existing law is likely to spawn as many 
difficulties as the Commission attempts to resolve in its proposed treatment of 
biotechnological inventions. This is in spite of recognising that 
"Harmonised protection throughout Member States is essential to maintain 
and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology^^ .^" 
More importantly however, it is recognised '^" that 
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"Uncoordinated development of national laws on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions in the Community could lead to further 
disincentives to trade, to the detriment of the industrial development of 
such inventions and of the smooth operation of the single market." 
The risks of erosion of the economic value of biotechnology patents seem to be 
well acknowledged in the rhetoric of the Biotech Directive and yet in such cases 
as Merck v Primecrown. it is submitted that the ECJ is prepared to squander the 
fruits of biotechnological invention even though it spans decades in development 
and requires enormous investment and risk to the intellectual property owner 
before being translated into pharmaceutical products. 
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CONCLUSION 
"It is ill, sitting at Rome and striving against the Pope" 
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CONCLUSION 
The over-arching principles and aims of the Community, as established in the Treaty 
of Rome are not criticised. However, their implementation in the field of intellectual 
property is. 
As was noted in Chapter Two, Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty have been interpreted 
by the ECJ with rigid adherence to Single Market principles, to the cost of the 
intellectual property proprietor, and in particular, its expectation of economic return 
through exploitation. 
The ECJ judgment in the Silhouette^^' case has done much to highlight fundamental 
issues concerning the scope of the principle of international exhaustion even though 
that case only directly concerned trade marks. Clarification of the position of other 
intellectual property rights is still needed. Future development could usefully be 
directed at achieving uniform treatment of different intellectual property rights on 
such fundamental matters as the interpretation of Articles 30 to 36. Adherence to 
notions of "specific subject matter" which vary across different intellectual property 
rights has been necessary in the interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 but general 
principles applicable to all rights are of far greater value. 
In the case of patents, there is no equivalent to the Trade Marks Directive unless the 
patent across a single European territory is introduced. In the meantime the 
disparities in relation to patent protection across Member States are set to continue, 
exacerbated by price differentials caused by government control in particular industry 
sectors. It is submitted that the most successful harmonisation measures are those 
such as the Trade Mark Directive, aimed at achieving the "unitary character" of a 
particular right and "designed to be substituted for the diverse national laws across 
the whole range of its provisions "^ ^^ . The level of resulting homogeneity will truly 
™ Case C-356/96 (n. 38 above) 
Paragraph 39 of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Silhouette 
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assist the due diligence process and limit the need for investigation of national laws 
to matters of procedure and enforcement. The success of this approach should be 
noted for the purpose of future measures. 
Likewise, copyright, as discussed, has not yet undergone Community-wide systematic 
harmonisation comparable to that of trade marks. The Commission has expressed 
concern in its Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design 1991 at the 
disparity between national design laws (made worse by a significantly lower period 
of protection given in the United Kingdom to design right). At present the 
Commission has adopted a draft Regulation^'^ and a draft Directive^''* both of 
which are likely to give rise to contentious debate. The draft Directive only aims at 
harmonisation of registered design (rather than unregistered design) law in Member 
States in line with the draft Regulation. However, Article 18(1) of the draft Directive 
states that 
"The extent to which and the conditions under which [unregistered design] 
protection is conferred, including the level of originality required, shall be 
determined by each Member State." 
Accordingly, harmonisation will be extremely limited and due diligence made even 
more complicated by further tiers of legislation. It appears that for so long as there 
are disparities within the Community in the level of substantive protection available 
for any given intellectual property right, the principles of Articles 30 to 36 will be 
interpreted by the ECJ at the expense of the intellectual property proprietor fMerck 
V Primecrown)^'^-
The focus of Chapter Three was the effect of competition law upon intellectual 
property in view of the far-reaching consequences for parties to agreements caught 
COM (93) 342 (1994) OJ C 37/20 
'^•^  COM (93) 344 (1993) OJ C 345/14 
Joined cases C-267/95 and C-268/95 [1996] E C R 1-6285] (n. 51 above) 
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by the prohibition in Article 85(1) if they are not notified under Article 85(3) or do 
not fall squarely within the ambit of automatic block exemption conferred by 
Commission regulation. For the intellectual property proprietor, the consequences 
include the loss of the economic value of intellectual property, because no purchaser 
of a company or business or other owner of intellectual property would lightly accept 
the risk of assuming intellectual property agreements that infringe Article 85(1). The 
expected commercial return under such agreements may be in jeopardy if crucial 
restrictions (particularly those designed to guarantee that return) are unenforceable. 
The agreement in its entirety might be void. The consequences of infringing Article 
85(1) also extend to loss of intellectual property value that inevitably stems from the 
grant of a licence with unenforceable territorial restrictions where this amounts to 
consent to the marketing of products, to which the principles of free movement and 
exhaustion (discussed in Chapter Two) apply. Clarification of the scope of Article 
85(3) has been offered by the Commission by publishing block exemption regulations 
but analysis shows that their scope is narrow and they are subject to extensive pre-
conditions for exemption that cannot be verified on due diligence examination. They 
offer little certainty to the parties that their agreement meets those terms or pre-
conditions. 
Suggestions for the future development of block exemption regulations would be to 
offer clearer and bolder guidance on intellectual property agreements. Further, block 
exemptions should be made available for copyright and trade mark licences to reflect 
the Commission's approach to licences of those intellectual property rights. Less 
adherence to market criteria would be a considerable advantage as well as the 
narrowing of the other pre-conditions to exemption which are not easily verifiable. 
As to harmonisation of national laws of competition, in the United Kingdom the 
Competition Bill will do a great deal to conform the competition law of the United 
Kingdom with the regime of Article 85(1), by adopting the text of Article 85(1) (with 
only essential adjustments necessary to relate it to the United Kingdom only) and in 
the interpretation Clause 60, provision is made for consistency with the treatment of 
corresponding questions arising in Community law. The harmonisation of the 
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competition laws of other countries would be an advantage. It must be recognised 
that for so long as the competition laws, and related laws of unfair competition and 
passing off of different countries remain unharmonised, they also could represent 
barriers to trade. For example, the position of sub-standard goods exported by the 
intellectual property owner to markets where they are not considered to cause a loss 
of reputation may still be subject to national law on "marketing usages considered fair 
and proper" to prevent reimportation^'*'. 
Chapter Four focused on the effectiveness of Directives. The measures so far taken 
in the field of copyright have left untouched previous international cooperation, such 
as the Berne Convention, and aimed to achieve only a degree of harmonisation within 
the Community. Discrepancies continue to apply between national systems 
concerning substantive issues which the Software Directive^'^ did not event attempt 
to correct. In fact the harmonisation effected by the Software Directive introduced 
uncertainties that never before existed (concerning those dealings with software 
interfaces that are no longer to be treated as infringing acts) and failed to deal with 
industry concerns, for example, of the independent maintenance lobby that sought to 
instigate change in the Directive to permit maintenance. At the same time, the 
Software Directive did not adequately deal with such fundamental matters as the 
question of exhaustion or competition as existing areas of developed law. 
The result of harmonisation with regard to copyright duration (by means of the 
Duration Directive^'*) has been complexity that defies due diligence examination of 
the true position of the copyright owner, aggravated by the continued national 
disparities and application of the principles of national treatment and reciprocity. 
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The need to take adequate account of sources of existing law was taken further, in the 
discussion concerning the Biotech Directive^'', especially given the likelihood that 
the failure will give rise to uncertainty in the future. The possibility remains of 
national discrepancies in patent protection with all the consequences for the patent 
proprietor that are apparent from Merck v Primecrown. 
It is therefore submitted that the consequences of all these harmonisation measures 
for the proprietor who wishes to maximise the potential return from intellectual 
property are twofold: the erosion of the commercial value of the intellectual property 
and the obfuscation of the scope of protection conferred. Nevertheless, the economic 
consequences of all of these measures must be examined by due diligence enquiry no 
matter how complicated the task, as suggested by Dworkin and J A L Sterling^"": 
"The entire thrust of the harmonising Directives and Regulations and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court is to ensure that intellectual property 
operates in accordance with the principles of the [European] Union rather than 
stands apart from them. Short term difficulties will eventually be forgotten. 
Nevertheless, the short-term difficulties must be identified and their economic 
consequences assessed." 
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